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Focusing on the period between WW11 and the mid-1990s, this thesis 
follows two main themes: (a) the national and international progression from 
ideological models to practical models of development through debate, 
compromise, and the tactical positioning of intellectuals and advocates, and (b) 
how the models in question have gained influence in international institutions, 
particularly the IMF, WB, WTO, and OECD, and how models of development are 
further expressed, developed, and disseminated from these platforms. 
The first theme evolves through critical discussion of key works by pivotal 
scholars who were particularly influential in this period, and the contrasts between 
central aspects of their distinct ideological models of national and international 
development. This theme is further developed via a historical narrative of political 
development in the U.S and to a lesser extent the U.K, which highlights the 
challenges facing those who seek to implement an ideological blueprint into a 
practical model of development. This analysis demonstrates the debate, 
compromise, and the tactical positioning of intellectuals and advocates which 
almost inevitably creates discrepancies between the ideological and practical 
models, and between national models based on the same ideology. 
Three distinct eras of capitalist development are identified and defined by 
their practical model of development. It is found that each has been intentionally 
implemented and has clear links to ideological counterparts.  
Using these distinct eras of capitalist development as guidance, the second 
major theme is explored through separate narratives of IMF, WB, WTO, and 
OECD development through the same time period. Findings demonstrate how 
each institution has been influenced by the U.S and the wider G7 and effectively 
serves as an extension of their geopolitical and economic interests, and how each 
has incorporated the three intentionally implemented models into its own 
workings. This analysis reveals a growing interconnectedness and cooperation 
between these institutions and shows how they have evolved into a coordinated 
network of knowledge producing policy advocates and enforcers. Findings also 
show the process of inducting nations into the policy frameworks developed 
within these institutions, and the embedding of nations into the global free-market 
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The objective of this thesis is to provide clarity and understanding to the debate 
around capitalist development between WW11 and the mid-1990s. Central to this 
project is to clearly distinguish key ideological conceptions of capitalism, their 
practical adaptations, and their historical development on national and global 
scales. This project brings together historical, geopolitical, economic, and social 
discourses in a sociological philosophy that sees sociology as the integrated study 
of these all too often segregated and compartmentalized academic areas.  
The key themes are (a) the national and international progression from 
ideological blueprints to practical models of development through debate, 
compromise, and the tactical positioning of intellectuals or supporters, and (b) 
how the practical models in question have gained influence in national and 
international institutions, particularly the IMF, WB, WTO, and OECD, and how 
models of development are further expressed, developed, and disseminated from 
these platforms. Of particular interest is how key supra-national institutions have 
developed in relation to these models between WW11 and the mid-1990s. They 
have become an ideologically saturated interconnected network of coordinated 
knowledge creation, policy advocacy, and enforcement.    
To explore these themes, the thesis utilizes Neilson’s adaptation of the 
French Regulation School’s ‘model of development’ concept. For David Neilson 
(2017) a model of development is “a practical regulatory project that has been 
designed and predictably calculated to deliver a national-trans-national 
configuration of regulation and accumulation. Critical to the [project] is the 
regulatory national template, functionally equivalent variations of which need to 
be widely adopted in order to construct the model of development in practice”. He 
also notes that “the aggregate effect of individual national actions, is a trans-
national regulatory framework that sets limits and possibilities of national actions 
[…and provides] an associated accumulation process” (Neilson, 2017. pp.8-9).  
That is, a practical model of development is comprised of an international 
legal framework and a national template which are both implemented in pursuit of 
particular ends. Each model of development is based on an ideological blueprint 




formulation. Practical models of development will always resemble their 
ideological blueprint but differ from them as practical implementation inherently 
involves compromise with existing political, social and economic issues, 
perspectives, and pressures.   
It must be stated that while this thesis is influenced by the French 
Regulation School and specifically David Neilson’s conception of the model of 
development, it does not subscribe to their perspectives, and as such differs in 
important ways. The models of development here are narrower than FRS 
conceptions, and draw more links to specific ideological blueprints. While FRS 
scholars conceive a broad practical project, which incorporates aspects of several 
differing ideological perspectives, and do not differentiate between neoliberal and 
neoclassical developments; this thesis takes a more nuanced approach, 
distinguishing these two schools of thought, and two separate practical models of 
development and ensuing eras of capitalism which sprout from them.   
 
Section one presents a diverse neoliberal literature, describing and 
discussing the proposed models and views of Ludwig Von Mises, Friedrich 
August von Hayek and Milton Friedman, who were key neoliberals before, during 
and after the project found practical traction. It juxtaposes these ideals with the 
blueprint of Lord Maynard Keynes, an influential economist whose original 
liberal thoughts took a very different trajectory to his neoliberal counterparts. The 
thesis then investigates the thoughts of Harry Dexter White on international 
economic relations, allowing the proper understanding (in section two) of the 
debates between himself and Keynes at the Bretton Woods conference and the 
practical implications of the final agreement, and transnational model. Finally, 
Section one delves into the views of Paul Samuelson who provides a hugely 
influential neoclassical doctrine which incorporates aspects of Keynesianism into 
an ideological blueprint with many similarities to neoliberalism.  
These are important ideological developments in any historical review of 
capitalism’s development, and between them they set the foundation for almost all 
practical capitalist developments between WW11 and the mid-1990s. 
Between them, these ideological blueprints set the grounds for further 




international practical developments which are based on but also deviate from 
these blueprints.    
  
Section two explores the practical implementation of capitalist 
development in the U.S and to a lesser extent the U.K. It explains the 
development, implementation and breakdown of the Bretton Woods model 
between 1942 and the early 1970s. It then demonstrates how, after a historical 
moment of unleashed speculative capital in the global economy, the neoliberal 
ideas of Friedman and the Chicago schools of economics and law gained a 
dominant backing in the U.S, and to a lesser extent, the U.K. Key insights are 
gleaned into the political conflicts, including class driven compromises, that went 
on within the government and policy lobbying think-tanks, and the cronyism of 
politics at the time. These conflicts saw key intellectuals hired to influential 
positions in promotion of ideological ends and the practical implementation of the 
Chicago school’s neoliberal blueprint in compromise with key ideas and policy at 
the time. The section moves on to outline the rise to prominence of neoclassical 
economics, and the practical mixed market economy template that served as its 
national template. This includes third-way formulations which themselves are 
political and ideological compromises between neoliberal and social democratic 
ideals. Section two concludes with a short discussion. 
Section two explores further the first theme. It displays the complexity of 
challenges, debate, and compromise involved in the adaptation of ideological 
blueprints to practically implemented models of development. The section 
demonstrates the practical implementation of three separate capitalist models of 
development, linking each practical model to its corresponding ideological 
blueprint, demonstrating practical deviations from the blueprint, and showing how 
these came to be.  
 
Section three displays the practical developments inside transnational 
institutions. It focuses on the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which later 
became the World Bank (WB); the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), later reformed as the Organisation for Economic 




and Tariffs (GATT), which was later incorporated into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Each of these was created in the wake of WW11, either 
under the Bretton Woods agreement, or to administer or compliment the Marshal 
plan to aid reconstruction and economic and political integration within Europe, 
and between Europe and the U.S. 
Their origins placed the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and WB) at odds 
with the Marshal Plan institutions, the (OEEC and GATT), as these largely 
undermined the formers functions. However, the evolution of these institutions 
since the late 1940s, under the constant guidance of the U.S and increasingly over 
the years, the G7, has seen this once contradictory institutional framework evolve 
into a cooperative and complementary, supranational, politico-economic 
powerhouse. This institutional network oversees the dominant transnational model 
of development (of which this thesis identifies three in succession), ensuring its 
stability and constant expansion and consolidation. 
The U.S’ and later the G7 nations’ control of voting quotas and shares 
ensures that this institutional framework serves their best interests. These interests 
combine geopolitical and economic motives, including the interests of their major 
transnational companies; both as their successes are in the best interest of their 
home nations, and in the interests of owners and shareholders.  
Each of these institutions has undergone restructuring or adaptations in 
line with the evolution of dominant economic and social discourse and the three 
distinct models of capitalist development identified in this analysis. By identifying 
these distinct models of development this thesis complements David Neilson’s 
conceptualization of the ‘model of development’. It does this by adding nuance to 
his historical analysis and textualizing capitalism’s development and the national 
and international processes involved in its uncomfortable and sometimes forced 
evolution.  
Section three explores the second major theme. It shows precisely how the 
three practical models of development discussed have gained influence in the 
IMF, WB, WTO and OECD, and how they have been further expressed, 
developed and disseminated from these platforms through a national policy 
template and transnational legal framework. The section also shows how these 
institutions developed under the leadership of the U.S and later the G7, into an 




global political framework based, in turn, on the three models of development and 
subsequently their ideological blueprints.  
 
This thesis explores and clarifies historical developments relevant to its 
two major themes, building a factual narrative and two clear conclusions from the 
premises found in each section. These conclusions are (a) that models of 
development are based on but deviate from ideological blueprints in compromise 
with existing political and social considerations, opposing intellectuals and agents, 
and exogenous pressures; and (b) that these models are consolidated and 
disseminated in/by the international institutional network via a national policy 
template and a transnational legal framework. 
 
Put short, this thesis shines a light on the ambiguity surrounding the term 
neoliberalism and clarifies distinct ideological blueprints which are often 
confused, or inappropriately lumped together. It demonstrates distinct practical 
models of development based on but deviating from them and shows how these 
models are implemented through a national template in compromise with existing 
socio-economic and political viewpoints, opposing intellectuals, and exogenous 
pressures.  
This thesis shows how the IMF, WB, OECD, and WTO began in 
competition during the Bretton Woods era, but have increasingly worked together 
since the late 1970s to insure the continued development and longevity of the 
neoliberal then neoclassical global economic orders. It definitively identifies this 
collaboration of global institutions as the main disseminators of these models of 
development via ideologically saturated national templates. Finally, the thesis 
demonstrates how the U.S and later the G7 have controlled global geopolitical and 







A Preliminary Note on Existing Literature 
 
In the arena of capitalist development, there are three major discourses 
which bear thought.  
The first is what I call the profitability argument. Proponents include 
Robinson, Harris, Carroll, Neilson, and a myriad of other academics in the social 
sciences. This is a neo-Marxist and often neo-Gramscian approach to the analysis 
of historical development. As such, scholars focus on capitalism and turn to 
labour, class, and hegemonic legitimacy analysis. The basic shared thesis is that 
transnational corporations and the transnational capitalist class who owns and 
controls them, have penetrated global political and economic institutions and 
adapted them to pursue their own goals; namely profit maximisation. Proponents 
emphasise negative outcomes such as fierce inequality, global warming, and 
financial instability to premise their conclusion; That capitalism, and particularly 
neoliberalism is not working, and that a more collectivist model is required if 
humanity is to survive and prosper on Earth. 
The second, espoused largely by historians and IPE scholars, is the 
geopolitical argument. The shared thesis here is that the U.S, G7 and other OECD 
nations have used their combined voting power in international regulatory 
institutions to install bias values and policy throughout the third world as a means 
of combating the spread of communism, particularly in the cold war era. 
Proponents such as Wolfe (2007) and David and Wilf (2017) focus on the rise and 
collapse of the Bretton Woods era and the rise of neoliberalism as an advancing of 
geopolitical goals in the face of spreading communism and socialism.  
The third is the spontaneous order argument. Preferred by economists, 
modernists, and globalisation theorists (although there is a Marxist formulation 
along similar lines). The thesis is basically that capitalism is a natural 
development in society, the culmination of individual action if you will. This style 
of argument claims that neoliberalism is a stage in this development and as such, 
is quite natural and not of great concern from a critical perspective (Marxist 
formulations claim this is the problem and that socialist style planning is the 
solution to inherent instabilities and inequalities in this model). Proponents 




poverty reduction, freedom of movement, increased trade, and GDP growth they 
believe has resulted from this development.   
 
This thesis sees that corporate and capitalist class interests have become 
influential in national and global political arenas, influencing but not controlling 
geopolitical decisions; in part because their influence warrants this on its own 
grounds, and in part because it serves a wider geopolitical purpose, i.e. impairing 
the spread of communism, and maintaining economic viability and influence. The 
balance of geopolitical considerations and international compromise, with 
economic and business interests considered, knowingly sets the legal framework 
in which national and international economies develop in a way observantly 







 New liberalisms in the 20th century. 
 
The development of capitalism is complex. Imperative to understanding it 
is the separation of heterogeneous theoretical works, defining them from each 
other, and from practical historical developments which are based on, but also 
deviate from them. The purpose of this section is to outline key aspects of these 
intellectual’s thinking in order to outline and analyze to a degree, the ideological 
blueprint proposed by each. By doing so it lays the foundation for both proceeding 
chapters and directly contributes to the first major theme. 
It looks firstly to a historical analysis of neoliberal literature stemming 
from as early as 1921. It juxtaposes the perspectives on equality, special 
privileges, monopoly, the role of the state, and international relations; of Ludwig 
von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman; each of whom have been key 
to the neoliberal movement. Through their views and a complementary historical 
analysis, it follows the ambiguous discourse through its development in the Mont 
Pèlerin Society (MPS), and also its linked but distinctly autonomous development 
within the Chicago schools of law and economics.  
Secondly, it explores another new liberalism of the 20th century, namely 
Keynesianism. It explores the work of Lord Maynard Keynes, juxtaposing it 
against the neoliberal writers, to uncover the key differences in the areas of 
equality, special privileges, monopoly, the role of the state, and international 
relations. 
It then gives Harry Dexter White’s views on the post-war international 
economy, as these are important to understand his role in the Bretton Woods 
agreement of 1944.  
Finally, it delves into the extensive works of Paul Samuelson, to divulge 
the same five aspects of his neoclassical views in contrast to those above. 
 
 
1.1: The Development of neoliberal Ideology. 
 
Neoliberalism is a pesky term in both sociological and economic 




historical narrative of neoliberal ideologies’ development. The origins of 
neoliberal tenets can be traced backwards, past the Washington Consensus, 
beyond MPS writers such as Friedman, Buchanan, Allais, Coase, Becker, Smith, 
and Vargos Llosa. Beyond the postwar formation of the MPS from the ranks of 
the pre-war Walter Lippman conference in France in 1938 attended by MPS 
founders Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Ropke, Alexander 
Rustow, Michael Polanyi, Allan Meltzer, Raymond Aron, and Louis Baudin. 
Indeed, neoliberalism’s conception predates the conference namesake’s 1937 
work An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society. Prior to this, there had 
been other conferences involving Hayek, Mises, Frits Machup, Lionel Robbins, 
Frank Knight, and John Van Sickle. It was in one of these that socialist calculation 
was first debated. But even before this, in his 1927 book Liberalisms, Ludwig von 
Mises was writing on the distressing state of liberalism, as was leopard von Weise 
in 1925. The term neoliberalism appears in the 1925 work Trends of Economic 
Ideas by Hans Honegger in the context of economic competition, 
entrepreneurship, and anti-state planning discourse. However, the search for 
Neoliberalism’s roots leads finally to the 1921 booklet Old and New Economic 
Liberalism by Eli. F. Heckscher (Plehwe. 2009a. P.10-14). 
 Heckscher turned from historian to economics professor in 1909. Prior to 
this he was an avid conservative (in the European sense of conservatism), but his 
new position required an emphasis on economic rather than social theory, and the 
real fear of German or Austro-Hungarian socialist dominance during WW1 
caused him to re-think his positions. He aligned himself with neo-conservative 
perspectives, drawing on writers such as Alfred Marshall and Friedrich Von 
Wieser, and built from them a framework for a new liberal economic doctrine. In 
lectures between 1918 and 1921, and in this 1921 booklet, he proposed free 
market ideals including free pricing, and the least possible government 
intervention (Plehwe, 2009a). But perhaps the most influential of these early 
1920s and 30s writers was Ludwig Von Mises.  
 
Mises sought in 1927 to update the liberal doctrine by providing a concise 
but comprehensive account of its fundamental principles and a statement of 
further developments to the liberal ideals since they were penned by the likes of 




based on private property, freedom of choice, the maintenance of peaceful 
national and international relations, democracy, and tolerance. Where Mises’ 
neoliberalism differs from the original liberal doctrines is in his views on equality 
and the role of the state. What follows are these views, as well as his views on 
special privileges, monopoly, and international relations. 
Far from the cries of earlier scholars; that all men are created equally, 
Mises claims that “Men are not equal, and the demand for equality under the law 
can by no means be grounded in the contention that equal treatment is due to 
equals” (Mises, 1927. P.28). Equality in the eyes of the law, Mises says, is 
justified in order to allow individuals to fulfil their own potentials, and to abolish 
bias restrictions on individuals from doing this, thereby abolishing 
disenfranchisement and the social and class conflict which follows it. Private 
property from this perspective is so much a greater good to all, that the sharp 
distinctions in wealth and income it allows by no means justifies its abolition. 
Indeed, the poorest have-nots are considered to have infinitely more opportunity 
to become a property owner than in any other system. This freedom, it is said, is 
worth more than the provisions of any system which provides limited equality 
through the abolishment of private property, whether of personal property or of 
the means to production. 
Furthermore, Mises claims that inequality of wealth and income, and more 
specifically the luxury consumption that accompanies it, serves a greater social 
purpose: “Luxury consumption provides industry with the stimulus to discover 
and introduce new things. It is one of the dynamic factors in our economy. To it 
we owe the progressive innovations by which the standard of living of all strata of 
the population has been gradually raised” (Mises, 1927. P.32). He gives several 
examples, one of which is the automobile. Once considered an item of the most 
unabashed luxury; through the consumption of the wealthy, the industry has 
grown to provide almost everyone with an automobile and the increased freedom 
of greater mobility.  
He goes on to deny the claim of critics; that the owner of the means of 
production, from an individual’s perspective, has a favoured position in society in 
that he can live and gain wealth without labouring. He argues that from a macro 
perspective, the capitalist fulfils the essential task of directing labour and 




that “The capitalist can keep his favoured position only by shifting the means of 
production to the application most important for society. If he does not do this—if 
he invests his wealth unwisely—he will suffer losses, and if he does not correct 
his mistake in time, he will soon be ruthlessly ousted from his preferential 
position” (Mises, 1927. P.67).  
He likewise dismisses the special needs of minorities and certain groups or 
strata of society. Labour’s demands for better wages, for example, are seen as 
folly. If successful, he argues, the increased wage costs must force the employer 
to decrease employment to remain profitable. This increases unemployment and 
the tax-payers burden. Mises argues that what the worker gains in increased 
wages, he loses in increased taxes, while the newly unemployed are obviously 
worse off for their efforts. 
As far as monopoly goes, Mises states that “monopoly prices are possible 
only where there is control over natural resources of a particular kind, or where 
legislative enactments and their administration create the necessary conditions for 
the formation of monopolies” (Mises, 1927. P.96). His argument for this rests on 
three premises. First that a monopoly in manufacture which increased prices 
above their competition rate would stimulate new entries and competition into the 
industry and force the monopoly prices back down. Second that a reduction in 
production to lower supply and thus force prices upward would do the same, 
while also releasing labour trained in the very forms of production which are in 
unnaturally high demand. Third, because no commodity that can be controlled by 
any one company, syndicate or cartel is of such importance to society that it can 
not be substituted by another product. His example is that of petroleum. He claims 
that a monopoly over petroleum would simply increase demand for coal and 
electricity.  
Mises accepted the possibility of actual monopolies forming around the 
control of natural resources but was not convinced these were necessarily 
detrimental. He claimed that this control could benefit society by retaining an 
increased portion of non-renewable resources for future generations. As for the 
exorbitant profits gained through such a monopoly, these could be taxed and 
redistributed into avenues for the benefit of all. It was Mises’ belief that 




Other monopolies were the result of non-liberal legislation such as tariffs, quotas 
or state favouritism.   
As Mises saw it, the role of the state “consists solely and exclusively in 
guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against 
violent attacks” (Mises, 1927. P.52). His proposed limits on the state go as far as 
to include the prohibition of morphine and heroin. His argument is that this type 
of prohibition is a slippery slope. If the state can limit the use of harmful drugs, 
why then should they not limit the consumption of unhealthy or harmful foods? 
Why not the prohibition of injurious sports? 
To facilitate the free-market was the state’s main task, and to legislate 
conditions of peace. Mises’ views on privatisation stretched to the claim that even 
judicial, police, healthcare, and education services be removed from the state lest 
the state attempts coercive or segregating measures through these institutions. All 
that is needed in his opinion is equal legislation for all, that private providers must 
adhere to.    
In international relations, Mises promotes unregulated, laissez-faire 
markets. His utopia rests on the assumption that all states are equally liberal in 
their avoidance of intervention and protectionism. He cites Ricardo, claiming 
basically that the comparative advantages of each nation would bring the 
appropriate private businesses to ensure strong exports. That the free movement of 
capital and people would see capital and labour move from the less productive 
areas of the world to those more suited to their uses; further utilizing the 
productive capacity of those productive areas while reducing the drag from non-
productive areas.  
We need not look beyond these elements of his argument to find some 
detrimental assumptions.  
The first is the assumption that production and consumption are based on 
societal needs and reasonable wants. In his day, the effects of widespread media 
and advertising were rather limited. The hindsight available to us now shows 
clearly that advertising and the miseducation of populaces lead to phenomenal 
increases in luxury spending on useless items which serve little purpose, even to 
those who purchase or receive them. This can be viewed as a direct misallocation 




societies most important needs will be forced either to shift their focus to these or 
relinquish their position.  
Funnily enough, this selection of viewpoints shines a light on an important 
contradiction in his work. That of the capitalist needing to meet societies most 
important needs, and Mises’ later defence of luxury spending. One could extend 
his argument to partially cover this by continuing his claim that luxury spending 
on technologically advanced products extends such industries, and therefore also 
extends the accessibility of these advances which are needed to advance society. 
But what of other items produced that serve little purpose or even cause large 
scale harm? Cigarettes for example, or plastic trinkets made to appeal to children, 
both of which serve no purpose but a momentary satisfaction of a want that would 
not have existed if the product had not been produced and/or advertised. If one 
followed Mises’ argument through, such products would not be consumed and the 
capitalists behind them would be forced to move on. This has not been the case, 
proving Mises incorrect and undermining his position that the owners of 
production do not have a favoured position within society, while putting into 
question his position on luxury consumption. 
His second debilitating assumption is a utopian tendency to imagine 
coherently liberal international relations. Many of his national level arguments 
assume international free-trade, however, once we accept that almost all nations 
will employ some degree of protectionism, much of his argument unravels. Not 
one nation comes to mind which has allowed completely free movement and 
employment of peoples from all other nations. It seems that while capital has been 
freed to take advantage of opportunities in almost all nations, people remain to a 
large extent cordoned off, unable to take benefit from opportunities abroad, and 
thus restricted to the opportunities presented to them, and subject to those 
removed, often by foreign multi-nationals.  
This leads us to his third major flaw, that monopolies are subject to new 
competition. While his argument is decent in this regard, Mises underestimates 
the effects of mergers, acquisitions and integration in a competitive system. 
Probably because these had not taken a prominent role in business activities in his 
time.  
These things considered, it must be accepted that Mises’ theory, if taken at 




production and the widespread misallocation of resources. It would be a world of 
winner and loser nations in which individuals are restricted to the opportunities 
presented to them by outside multinationals, many of which would be mono/duo/ 
or oligarchic in nature.  
One must, therefore, conclude that the viewpoints set out in Liberalism, 
while providing a nice picture for how things might have been, are overly 
optimistic and utopian, having little practical use in the real world. In fact, one 
would do much better with the works of Adam Smith than with Mises’ updated 
version of the doctrine. This said, many of Mises’ ideas remained in circulation 
for years to come, and as will be seen, many found a home in the Chicago schools 
of law and economics, particularly in the works of Friedman. 
 
The term neoliberalism emerged again at the colloque Walter Lippman, in 
reference to the proposed neoliberalism which emphasized “the priority of the 
price mechanism, […] free enterprise, the system of competition, and a strong and 
impartial state” (Plehwe, 2009a, 2009. P.14). The conference was called to discuss 
the development and implementation of this neoliberalism which was seen as a 
necessary revitalisation of the politically struggling classical liberal doctrines. It 
resulted in the launch of “a journal (Cashiers du libéralisme), and a think tank, the 
Centre international d’études pour la rénovation du libéralisme (CIRL), with the 
head office in Paris (the first president was the entrepreneur Louis Marlio) and 
auxiliary offices in Geneva (Röpke), London (Hayek), and New York 
(Lippmann)” (Plehwe, 2009a. P.14). However, their ambitions were somewhat 
thwarted by the politico-economic calamity of WW2.  
 
The influx of socialist state planning ideas and actors willing to enforce 
them, particularly in Germany and Austria, but which rapidly spread through 
Europe alongside, but not in the confinement of the lines of war; sent the 
neoliberal movement underground. Switzerland became a place of refuge for the 
ideological refugees and would host the first MPS gathering in 1947. Post-WW11 
conditions opened the field for politico-economic and ideological debate once 
more, and a group of well-meaning neoliberals met in Mont Pèlerin.  
On top of those who had attended the Walter Lipmann conference in 




the University of Freiburg and a friend of both Ropke and Hayek. Euken is 
considered the father of German Ordo-liberalism, and his ideas would become 
hugely influential, in both German politics where they provided the foundation of 
the social-market economy, and within the MPS, of which he served as first vice 
president. Also new were Aaron Director and Milton Friedman, U.S scholars of 
the University of Chicago’s influential and interconnected schools of law and 
economics (Plehwe, 2009). These two schools, the Ordoliberal and Chicago, are 
seen as two distinct tracks of neoliberal development, and while the two shared 
many early affinities which can be found in their mutual respect for Chicago 
economist Henry Simons, a keen proponent of classical liberalism and advocate of 
Adam Smith, the two would diverge greatly (Plewe, 2009a).  
However, the key Scholar throughout the Walter-Lipmann conferences 
and the development of the MPS was Friedrich August von Hayek. His most 
famous work, The Road to Serfdom, is a must read and is still considered relevant 
today.  
 
Hayek differed from Mises in almost all areas of importance to this thesis. 
He went beyond equality in the eyes of the law, acknowledging deeper societal 
issues. He says that “in a system of free enterprise chances are not equal, since 
such a system is necessarily based on private property and though perhaps not 
with the same necessity, on inheritance, with the differences in opportunity which 
these create. There is indeed a strong case for reducing this inequality of 
opportunity as far as congenital differences permit and as it is possible to do so 
without destroying the impersonal character of the process by which everybody 
has to take his chance and no person's view about what is right and desirable 
overrules that of others” (Hayek, 1944. P.106). This shows a recognition of the 
struggles and bias facing those born poor. It also shows he was at least open to 
discussing the social consequences of exorbitant inheritances in a negative light.  
His theory approached special privileges in a similar manner to Mises but 
went beyond Mises’ argument of the secondary effects of wage privileges. To 
Hayek organised labour had also aided the formation of monopolies by giving 
some employed groups undue privilege which grew with the success of 
monopolists, especially when backed by the state. He says, “The fatal turning 




its original ends only by fighting all privilege, the Labour Movement, came under 
the influence of anti-competition doctrines and became itself entangled in the 
strife for privilege” (Hayek, 1944. P.205). This provided an incentive for the state 
to support working and middle classes via anti-competitive policy which leads to 
the centralisation of economic power in private hands. He argues that this 
privileged those securely employed in the best-organised industries at the cost of 
those employed elsewhere or unemployed. It also came at the cost of would-be 
entrepreneurs and the economic freedom of future generations. 
This is not to say that less fortunate individuals should face the horrors of 
their fate unaided. Hayek, unlike Mises, understood that markets were inherently 
imperfect and unlikely to provide full employment. He thus made allowances for 
state organised social insurance, and even the provision of jobs, providing they 
efficiently completed tasks which are necessary or beneficial to society. In his 
own words, “there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and 
clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity to work, can be assured to 
everybody” (Hayek, 1944. P.125-126).   
Monopoly, whether groups in society are convinced of its value or not, is 
viewed as inherently undesirable. Like other peers in the MPS however, Hayek 
preferred private monopolies to state monopolies. He believed a state monopoly 
would almost indefinitely utilise its power to entrench its own monopoly, making 
it difficult for the public to effectively critique or alter. His preference was the 
regulation of private monopolies via strict price controls that inhibited exorbitant 
and unfair profit margins while allowing new competitive entrants into the 
markets. This he argued, would confine the formation of monopolies to those 
industries in which it is inevitable. It would stop the extortion of the public by 
monopolists, and it would incentivise new competitive alternatives. “Only make 
the position of the monopolist once more that of the whipping boy of economic 
policy and you will be surprised how quickly most of the abler entrepreneurs will 
rediscover their taste for the bracing air of competition!” (Hayek, 1944. P.204).  
Hayek also showed concern over Patent and other intellectual property laws as 
they have the potential to block and reduce competition, thereby aiding the 





As far as the role of the state goes, it will be obvious by now that Hayek 
allows for intervention in several aspects of social and economic life. Be it the 
regulation of monopoly, the organisation and/or provision of social insurance and 
state employment, the control of monetary policy and supply, the provision of 
healthcare and security, or any other task deemed beneficial or necessary to 
society which the competitive market is ill-suited to provide. Hayek is best 
described as an interventionist, although critics of neoliberalism are quick to lump 
him in with the likes of Friedman and Mises. 
In international relations he believed in a supranational federation. He 
argued against any array of supra/international economic institutions on the 
grounds that these would wield unprecedented economic power whilst themselves 
being unchecked or regulated by any political authority. The federation, founded 
on laissez-faire policy, would oversee the global economy with minimal 
interference, except to regulate global monopolies and intervene in violent 
international relations in order to keep the peace and maintain economic and 
social stability. For this purpose, it would organise and wield substantial military 
power. To combat the obvious concerns this raises, the federation would be held 
to a strict constitution by a truly democratic process of the international 
community.  
In Hayek’s ideal world this federation would maintain international peace 
and stability while individual states remained free to democratically decide their 
own structures and fates. Hayek said, “We shall all be the gainers if we can create 
a world fit for small states to live in” (Hayek, 1944. P.242).  
While the arguments and challenges of socialism, communism and 
totalitarianism are largely defeated today, much of the argument put forward by 
Hayek in The Road to Serfdom is still applicable in contemporary capitalist 
societies. Competition has not been respected and several academics point out that 
a cadre of oligarchic elitists has arisen (see Carroll, 2010; Robinson 2004). It is 
particularly relevant to the current era of global capitalism in which an integrated 
network of supra-national institutions has emerged in alignment with economic 
ideological positions. These are precisely the unchecked economic institutions 




contemporary world, are the sections in The Road to Serfdom on knowledge 
creation, education, concentrated power, the creation of truth, and propaganda. 
 
While European neoliberalism largely followed Hayek, Euken and Ropke 
toward what is now known as ordo-liberalism (at least until the 1980s), American 
neoliberalism took another route which we shall explore here. 
Hayek held communications with Simons from as early as 1934 and the 
two had long intended an American neoliberal movement in the fashion of those 
in Europe, holding private correspondence to that effect for over a decade before 
the seeds began to sprout (Plehwe, 2009a). It was a bumpy ride at first and the 
sprout of what would become the debated Chicago school of law and economics 
was almost trampled as Aaron Director whom Hayek had recruited to direct the 
Free Market Project (FMP) squabbled with the university over tenure contracts. 
The nefarious Volker Fund headed by Harold Luhnow had agreed to pay 
Director's wages for five years and had devoted $75000 in research funds to the 
project which was to establish “a suitable legal and institutional framework of an 
effective competitive system” (Coase,1998, 603).  
Simon committed suicide in 1946, and his decision to do so has been 
linked to both continuous disappointments with the university, and a loss of 
control and direction of the FMP (Mirowski & Van Horn, 2009). During the 
mutual grieving process, Hayek was able to convince Director to take on the 
project without a promise of tenor, and on these grounds, the proposal was 
accepted, and the FMP began in truth, albeit without its biggest link to classical 
liberalism.  
After the proposal’s acceptance, however, Lunhow announced a final 
condition for Volker fund support; that his associates Leonard Read and Loren 
Miller head the advisory committee, and that Miller reviewed the shortlist of 
candidates for the projects executive committee prior to its release. In this way 
Lunhow ensured a large influence on the political philosophy of the project from 
the outset, an influence which can be seen in Read’s harsh critique of Simon’s 
posthumously published Economic Policy for a Free Society. The critique 
attacked the regulatory aspects of Simon’s argument, claiming “it is so well 




field” ((Quoted in HPHI, Letter from Read to Director, November 24, 1947, box 
58, folder William Volker Fund 1939–1948) Mirowski and Van Horn, 2009. 
P.156-57). It caused a great deal of controversy and debate between scholars 
involved in the project and the Volker representatives. In the end, Hayek got 
involved in the discussions, making compromises with Lunhow to keep the 
project running, albeit with a corporate entrenchment which would alter economic 
debate, policy, and subsequently the global economy until the present. 
On this note, it is worth demonstrating the change in perspective that 
occurred within the FMP scholars between the project’s conception in 1946 and 
its completion in 1952. Presented here are four sets of quotes. The first two are 
from separate (MPS and FMP respectively) presentations by Director and 
Friedman in 1947, pre-perspective shift; the third is a collection of quotes from 
Van Horn (2009) as he reviews Director’s 1950 and 1951, post-shift presentations 
and works; and the fourth is from Friedman’s 1951 Free Enterprise, post 
perspective shift.  
 
“The unlimited power of corporations must be removed. Excessive 
size can be challenged through the prohibition of corporate ownership of 
other corporations, through the elimination of interlocking directorates, 
through a limitation to the scope of activity of corporations, through 
increased exercise of control of enterprise by property owners and perhaps 
too through a direct limitation of the size of corporations” (Director, 1947 
MPS meeting. Cited in Van Horn, 2009. P.212).   
 
In this, Director is publicly promoting the direct regulation of the size and 
ownership mechanisms of corporations. This, as we have seen, is in line with the 
neoliberal thinking of Hayek and the rest of the MPS at that time. Friedman’s 
perspectives also ran fairly parallel to the wider MPS and neoliberal movement: 
 
The ““separation of [corporate] ownership from control has 
important social disadvantages. It encourages utilization of resources for 
purposes other than maximisation of their return; greatly facilitates the 
securing of monopoly positions; and gives rise to private monopolies of 




remedy was to increase the ownership interest of the corporate directors. 
“By identifying ownership with control,” he believed, “the proposal would 
eliminate many of the present abuses of the corporate form. It would 
immediately eliminate holding companies . . . it would make mergers more 
difficult; . . . These effects would themselves retard the tendency (if it 
exists) toward increasingly large and monopolistic organisations and 
stimulate the breakdown of existing giant corporations.” Thus, in 1947 
Friedman advanced a standard premise of classical liberalism: large 
corporations and monopolies posed a serious social problem that had to be 
addressed by public policy”” (Van Horn, 2009. Internal quotes from 
TSPR, box 39, Free Market Study). 
 
The perspectives of these two thinkers, however, were about to change 
dramatically. Just three years later, in his 1950 review of Unions and Capitalism 
by Charles Lindblom, Director introduced a theory which directly contradicted his 
previous works; that competition would, if free from government intervention, 
undermine monopolies and lead to an equilibrium of competitive market forces. 
He claimed further in a 1951 conference on corporate law and finance, that 
politics is “a residual consideration for economists” (Van Horn, 2009. P.218). He 
also claimed that “monopoly power did not get projected from one market to 
another [… and could not] hinder choice in the labour market […] or the capital 
market” (Van Horn, 2009. P.218). For Director the corporation became the ideal 
form of capitalist organisation because it “neither hindered nor promoted 
monopoly, but also because it approximated the impersonal ideal of the market” 
(Van Horn, 2009. P.218). 
 
Friedman followed suit in his 1951 work, Free Enterprise. For him, 
“monopoly only persists when it receives open support from government – 
suggesting that the divergence between corporate ownership and control had a 
nugatory influence on the persistence of monopoly” (Van Horn, 2009. P.219). He 
also claimed, “monopoly had a benign effect on wages and prices, and that 
“private monopoly should be preferred to public monopoly and public regulation 





Thus, we see an interesting twist in the perspectives of key Chicago 
University scholars in the early years of Volker funded research. These 
perspectives shifted from their origins in well-established intellectual passages, to 
a dogmatic perspective proposed by representatives of the corporate-owned 
Volker fund.  
As will be seen in the following sections, the repercussions of these 
perspective shifts have been phenomenal. The backing of these frankly unviable 
premises, and the intellectually irresponsible and dogmatic ideology which would 
later follow them has led, as will be demonstrated, to an era of capitalism which 
would unabashedly favour the imperialist ideas and profits of few over the welfare 
of many, and further taint the reputation of capitalism globally.  
Looking no further than these early post-shift statements, we can see easily 
that the most progressive, fair, and stability enhancing aspects of liberal thinkers 
such as Smith, and even the nuanced arguments of Hayek have been replaced by a 
starry-eyed optimism which it seems unlikely any intellectual could honestly be 
sold by.  
It is also interesting to note that Hayek was refused employment in either 
the Chicago school of economics or that of law, and that during his time in the 
Chicago school of social thought, he was not involved in the FMP which he had 
initiated over a decade of correspondence. More interesting still is that Director’s 
name did not appear on the completed work and that the Volker foundation was 
mentioned only briefly in the preface, and not in its role as a funder. Instead, the 
FMP of creating an American Road to Serfdom came to fruition a decade late with 
the 1962 publication of Capitalism and Freedom by Milton Friedman (Mirowski 
& Van Horn, 2009). This marks Friedman as a key pillar in the Chicago school’s 
diversion from previous neoliberal scholars. It is a work that bears further 
investigation. 
 
Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, though he took many cues from 
Hayek, is more associable with Mises, though still undeniably distinctive. 
 Equality for Friedman is not of great concern. Equality of outcome is both 
undesirable and impractical. He does make some throws toward equality of 
opportunity, mainly through privatised education at all levels, and private 




incentivised by a contract promising the benefactor or investor a percentage of the 
student’s future earnings. It is thought that this presents the market opportunity to 
invest in labour as if it were a fixed investment. He claimed it would offer 
equalised opportunity via an impersonal merit-based system, whilst preventing the 
over-investment associated with widespread government subsidies in vocational 
training.  
He also had much to say on welfare and public housing. His views 
basically stated that public housing and welfare should be abolished. Housing 
should be left to the private markets, while welfare should be restrained to a 
limited negative income tax to provide extra cash rather than any collection of 
issue-specific provisions.  
 Aside from this negative income tax, Friedman abhorred all special 
privileges in society. Whether founded on grounds of racial, religious, 
professional or any other discrimination. Friedman argued that the existence of 
these privileges impeded market mechanisms.  
Policy which enforced employment of a certain ratio of a certain race, he 
argued, impeded the market by not giving proprietors the opportunity to meet 
their customer’s desires and expectations. One premise was that if a store in an 
area where racial discrimination was the norm was forced to employ coloured 
employees, then it would decrease customer satisfaction, impede on his margins, 
and result in a diminished service and less aggregate employment. This reduces 
the proprietor’s, as well as released staff’s income; and subsequently the flow on 
benefits to other market actors. We might, however, think that if one store has this 
enforcement, then all stores of a similar type also have it. Therefore, the customer 
of the store in question will find no preferable solution, i.e. no store of a similar 
type with no coloured employees, and as such, no other store would have a 
competitive benefit over the store in question. Thus, the store would continue with 
minimal change to its customer base. Friedman failed to note this, whereas Hayek 
made amends for logically similar policies, claiming that so long as they were 
applied universally, they would be consistent with the ideals of competition.  
 Friedman’s solution was to convince those who would discriminate that 
their ways were unfounded in any meaningful argument. While this re-education 
is still a much-needed service, one finds further flaws in his shallow argument.




to note: that the free market for labour and employment have been heavily 
distorted in almost all ex-colonies by the extortion of native populaces, and the 
import and extortion of others. Such distorted exploitations were, as Friedman 
would agree, founded on dogmatic fallacies. Simply enforcing a free-market, 
while it restores some freedom of social and economic mobility, by no means 
restores the sustained and inherited losses of previous restrictions of freedom to 
certain groups of society. The special privileges put in place ought not to be 
thought of as favouritism, but as a restoration of appropriate freedoms and 
opportunity to populaces who, had the markets remained undistorted and thus free 
and fair, would hold relative freedoms and opportunities in their original localities 
or in areas their ancestors had freely chosen to migrate to. Thus, these privileges 
ought to be seen as a re-balancing or calibration of the market to a state closer to 
that which its undistorted progression would have achieved. 
 Friedman writes in depth about monopoly. Though he considers it 
undesirable, he goes to great efforts to show how unfettered private monopoly is 
preferable to either government monopolies or regulation of private monopolies. 
He breaks monopoly down into three types: industry, labour, and government; and 
provides three root causes: technical, direct or indirect government interference, 
and private collusion.  
 He claims the existence and importance of monopoly of industry is 
exaggerated by the media and in popular belief. Monopoly of industry in its worst 
form results from government intervention, either by taking direct control via 
ownership and legislating for its continuation; or by regulating an industry to the 
extent that it becomes a government supported cartel. The second way an 
industrial monopoly can come to be is via a technical monopoly. Technical 
monopolies occur when it “is more efficient or economical to have a single 
enterprise rather than many” (Friedman, 1962, P.108). He goes on to claim that 
“the areas in which technical considerations make monopoly a likely or a probable 
outcome are fairly limited. They would offer no serious threat to the preservation 
of a free economy if it were not for the tendency of regulation, introduced on this 
ground, to spread to situations in which it is not so justified” (Friedman, 1962. 
P.109). Addressing collusion, Friedman quotes Adam Smith, saying, "People of 
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 




raise prices." (Smith, 1776. P.130; Friedman, 1962. P.111). He uses this as a 
premise to claim such collusion happens frequently, but claims that such 
collusion, if not supported by government interventions in the market, will be 
short lived. Not only does each partner have an incentive to undercut the agreed 
price and thus gain market share from the others, but new entrants can expect 
either to charge the premium or gain said market share. 
 A monopoly of labour, he claims, is also overexaggerated but still has 
important ramifications for the market and society. Such a monopoly results from 
the mass collusion of labour which is capable of closing factories for days at a 
time. Such collusion, he claims, is more dangerous when it is supported by 
government intervention, giving it the legitimacy to manipulate markets and 
ultimately alter the labour market. 
 Government monopolies take two forms as mentioned. Direct government 
intervention by which the government takes and ensures its ownership and control 
of industry, and indirect government intervention which often unintentionally 
limits competition. “Perhaps the three clearest examples are tariffs, tax legislation, 
and law enforcement and legislation with respect to labor disputes” (Friedman, 
1962. P.109).  
Alas, his efforts are in vain. While he makes some worthy points, like 
Mises, Friedman’s assumptions miss the importance of mergers, acquisitions and 
integration in a competitive system. Friedman also failed to mention two forms of 
monopoly associated with these concerns.  
A monopoly of industry dominance occurs when a company gains a 
market share and level of wealth which allows it to control prices or simply buy 
out competitors at a multiplied evaluation as to make the offer near irresistible. 
While it may be unlikely that such a monopoly could fully be ascertained, it 
certainly bears thinking about.1 Another form of monopoly left undiscussed is a 
 
1 It also raises an important question about desirable levels of competition in a free 
market. Obviously, the ability of any one company or conglomerate of companies to set prices 
marks imperfect competition, but beyond this there seems to be little discussion. Does an 
industry’s market become un-competitive when one company holds more than 50% of market 
share, or is it 20%? Perhaps its 10% or 60%? This consideration, and any given answer has 
important ramifications, yet I have not found it discussed. Perhaps it could be judged on the 




monopoly of ownership, whereby a person, group of people, holding company 
etc, gain ownership of a dominant share of companies in one industry. In such a 
monopoly, the owner’s share of an industry is spread across separate companies, 
giving the illusion of competition. Oddly it is the two forms of monopoly not 
mentioned by Friedman which are, alongside collusion, most likely to occur or be 
worked toward in a less regulated free-market economy. 
 For Friedman the role of the state is quite simply “to provide a means 
whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate differences among us on the 
meaning of the rules, and to enforce compliance with the rules on the part of those 
few who would otherwise not play the game” (Friedman, 1962. P.29). It can be 
deduced from his discussions on international trade, which put shortly, sees no 
difference between national and international relations (as the individual is the 
focus of his doctrine, and any restrictions put on international trade inherently 
restrict individuals within, they are seen to be unacceptable), that these same 
tenets are the only desirable action for any supranational institution or global 
political body.  
 Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom is seen here as a farce. A shallow and 
face value economic analysis which, while supporting the interests of its funders, 
regresses the economic debate half a century to the blind or arrogant optimism 
held by Mises. The key difference being, and one reason that Friedman’s views 
were implemented above Hayek’s; that Friedman possessed the mathematical 
skills and astuteness to invent practical measures to implement his ideas into 
policy. Hayek, whose philosophy and ideas are obviously preferable, lacked such 
 
results. After all, how competitive is an industry if one company holds 60% of the market while 
the remaining 40% is split 10 ways? No, it seems infinitely preferable to restrict the market by 
percentage, but where is the line to be drawn? And ought it be drawn on national or global scales?  
Some may ask why the market should be regulated at all, or even assert that it should not. 
But one need only read Hayek to ascertain that an economy consisting of a combination of 
oligarchic, or worse, monopolistic industries bears little differentiation to a socialist state, the 
difference being that the ruling elite has in such a system, no obligation to provide any sustenance, 
or anything else, to anyone not directly employed by them. So, why regulate the economy by 
percentage of market share? Because an unregulated global or even national market economy will 





skills. In fact, his technical works were widely critiqued, and he gave up on such 
works, choosing to focus on theoretical arguments.    
 
In Capitalism and Freedom Friedman shows himself as the key progenitor 
of Chicago’s distinct tract of neoliberalism, which will be referred to henceforth 
as Friedmanite neoliberalism, as opposed to ordo-liberalism or Hayekian 
neoliberalism. It is this Friedmanite track which has served the most nefarious 
purpose within global politico-economic developments, and which has become 
the centre of much of the most scholarly debates across several academic 
disciplines internationally.  
 
The Chicago-Volker partnership was simultaneously, from 1953, 
publishing works in a second venture; the Anti-Trust Project. Also headed by 
Director, the project involved several then current and soon to be MPS members; 
John Jewkes, Edward Levi, William Letwin, and John McGee. In a coalition 
which disbanded between 1955 and 1957, they published several individual and 
joint works, which are broadly summarised in Director and Levi’s 1956 article, 
Trade Regulation. In alignment with Friedman’s values, as set out in Capitalism 
and Freedom, this is a pro-corporate take on antitrust laws which focuses 
significantly on exclusionary practices, “that is, any practices that preclude or 
prevent competitors from entering the market” (Van Horn, 2009. P.222). These 
include “Price discrimination, vertical integration, tying arrangements, and resale 
price maintenance” (Van Horn, 2009. P.223).  
Director and Levi claimed that exclusionary practices neither “create or 
extend monopoly” (Director & Levi, 1956. P.290. Cited in Van Horn, 2009. 
P.225). They argued: 
 
“some monopoly power was necessary to impose a coercive 
restriction; otherwise a firm’s total cost would be higher than total 
revenue. Because of the reduction in price, the firm would invariably lose 
some of its original power, and a consequence of the reduction in price 
was a decrease in revenue—suggesting that a firm’s original power did not 
depend, as classical liberals contended, on political power. Thus, the 




discrimination, and as a means of price discrimination, the restrictions 
would be merely an enjoyment of the original monopoly power, not an 
extension of it” (Director & Levi, 1956. P.290. Cited in Van Horn, 2009. 
P.225).  
 
Vertical integration was to them “explainable as a method [of] price 
discrimination” (Director & Levi, 1956. P.293. Cited in Van Horn, 2009. P.226), 
and while they accepted that price fixing via the collusion of industry participants 
could lead to predictable adverse effects, they claimed that the severity of these 
effects and therefore the grounds for illegality would vary depending on the 
market share held by colluders. They argued that “[t]he extension of the Sherman 
Act into remoter nooks and crannies of commerce because of the broadened view 
of commerce among the states […] may be thought to raise some questions as to 
the worthiness of a prohibition of all forms of price fixing, regardless of the 
market effects” (Director & Levi, 1956. P.295. Cited in Van Horn, 2009. P.226-
27). 
 They went on to claim that in the “field of [antitrust] law more than any 
other, the general presumptions are of such a character that they cannot be readily 
isolated from the corresponding presumptions which dominate economic theory. 
We do suggest that in the future there may well be a recognition of the instability 
of the assumed foundation for some major antitrust doctrines. And this may lead 
to a re-evaluation of the scope and function of the antitrust laws” (Director & 
Levi, 1956. P.296. Cited in Van Horn, 2009. P.227). 
The Antitrust and indeed the Chicago school’s economic theory in general 
rests on implicit linguistic tautologies and logical fallacies. As Flynn (1983) 
Pointed out “[w]hat is involved in this kind of thinking is a series of covert 
tautologies. Whatever the market does is efficient, and "efficiency" is whatever 
the market does. The law should not interfere in whatever is efficient; whatever 
the "market" does is efficient; the law should not, therefore, interfere with the 
market” (Flynn, 1983. P.281). He goes on to argue: 
 
“Values broader than those recognised by the model and facts that 
are inconsistent with the model's assumptions are ignored or are judged to 




and short-term consequences of particular practices, the maldistribution of 
wealth and power in society, the existence of forces undermining the 
"rationality" of consumers, the function of time and causation in the 
analysis and imperfections in the market structure cannot be quantified and 
therefore are not factored into the equation. […] Reliance on social and 
political values in formulating what the law "ought" to be is rejected by the 
antitrust analysis of the Chicago school because those values are 
considered irrelevant and unknowable. […] This leaves the proponents of 
economic theorising in antitrust free to continue using their model, while 
ignoring reality, congressional intent, moral values, the contribution of 
other disciplines and the insights of other schools of economic thought. 
After all, they have "truth," and it is a "truth" that always tests out because 
the model is both the condition for truth as well as its expression” (Flynn, 
1983. P.283).  
   Theoretically, and in broad terms, this Friedmanite neoliberalism espouses 
a free market economy with minimal government intervention in labour, wage, 
and antitrust laws, but strong protection of private property and specifically patent 
laws. They oppose any collective state action including welfare programs, state 
education and state healthcare. Proponents argue for the privatisation of all 
industrial government functions including roading, infrastructure and energy 
production. They claim that monopoly is not a concern, and that unregulated 
private monopoly would be infinitely preferable to public monopoly. They argue 
for low personal and abolished corporate taxes, as well as the abolishment of 
import/export tariffs. They see the market economy as central to freedom and 
democracy, and as the central organisational institution of society. Any 
regulations or limitations placed upon the market are therefore considered as 
regulations or limitations of individual freedom and democracy. They claim that 
individual liberty is an end in itself and claim that any hindrances to this are 
immoral and unacceptable. And finally, but certainly not of less importance, they 
promote government austerity and monetarist economics to control inflation 
(when deemed necessary) and achieve consumer welfare (not to be mistaken for 
social welfare). Their theory is based on the prior assumption that the perfect 
market is not only possible but is hiding behind the regulatory efforts of national 




world and as such is the bottom line of moral concern (Friedman, 1962; Flynn, 
1983; Mirowski & Van Horn, 2009; Van Horn, 2009a).   
 
 
1.2: The Other New Liberals: Keynes and White. 
 
The above neoliberals and their peers were not the only people to attempt 
a re-vamp of the liberal doctrine to suit the changing times. Lord John Maynard 
Keynes was also writing prolifically through the early 1900s. His magnum opus 
was perhaps the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, first 
published in 1936. In this work, he postulates very different perspectives to his 
neoliberal counterparts on our five key issues. 
 Whilst defending a degree of inequality of wealth and income as necessary 
incentives for individuals to maximise their own output, Keynes argues that 
limitations to inequality are also justified and desirable. The argument that the 
national aggregate of capital is best served by allowing the rich to accumulate 
wealth is seen as a fallacy. Redistributive taxes are qualified on the grounds that 
redistributing the wealth “in a way that is likely to raise the propensity to consume 
may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital” (Keynes, 1936. P.332). 
 Keynes adds that his theory aids equality in several ways. The lowered 
rate of interest, increased employment and access to finance, results in (a) stable 
consumption of goods and control of recession as to achieve perpetual growth; (b) 
a subsequent accumulation of national capital until it is no longer scarce; (c) 
increased investment as capital is more accessible; (d) full employment and thus 
wages for everyone; (e) a subsequent inability of capitalists to exploit labour via 
labours oversupply and thus lower price; (f) maintained profitability of enterprise 
with lower income due to reduced interest rates; and (g) decreased tacit income of 
money lenders due to a scarcity of capital and high interest rates.     
 Though not seen as special treatment by Keynes, but rather as a 
mechanism for economic stability; he argues for rigid wage policy via collective 
bargaining on an industry by industry basis. Arguing against classical economists 
and the notion held by both Mises and Friedman that reducing wages increases 
employment, Keynes says that lowering wages necessarily decreases demand for 




through rigid wage policy that stable demand, accumulation and employment can 
be achieved. Rather than welfare, Keynes promoted public works and investment 
as a means of achieving and maintaining full employment, thus abolishing the 
need for welfare at all. 
Keynes makes no explicit mention of monopoly, or any preferable level of 
competition. He does refer to perfect and imperfect competition, however, there 
has been some debate around how this ought to be interpreted. A standard view in 
neo/post-Keynesianism is that his theory is relevant regardless of any perfect, 
imperfect or monopolistic state of competition, and as such, that Keynes adopted 
no position or assumptions of competition (Davidson, 1962; 2002); Chick (1993; 
1992). On the other hand, Hayes (2008) argues that Keynes assumed a state of 
perfect competition, taken to mean that no economic actor had the power to set 
prices. This essay takes a differing view again. A statement on page 367 shows 
that he recognised the state of imperfect competition of his era: “For it may be the 
case that the practical workings of the laws of imperfect competition in the 
modern quasi-competitive system…” (Keynes, 1936. P.367). Another on 336-7 
shows his recognition of the classical school’s approach to competition: “if we 
have dealt otherwise with the problem of thrift, there is no objection to be raised 
against the modern classical theory as to the degree of consilience between private 
and public advantage in conditions of perfect and imperfect competition 
respectively. Thus, apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an 
adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest, there 
is no more reason to socialise economic life than there was before.” (Keynes, 
1936. P.336-7). If Adam Smith is taken as our classical economist, this shows 
preference toward perfect competition, and a necessity for the regulation of 
monopolistic forces. So, while Keynes recognised the imperfect state of 
competition in his own era, he maintained the attitude that this ought not to be so. 
However, reflecting the cynicism held throughout his general theory, he has 
crafted it to be equally plausible in each scenario. This is more in line with 
prevalent views but does not assume any passivism on Keynes’ part.   
As far as the role of the state goes, Keynes expands it in several ways from 
the classical position, and as such is obviously at odds with the above neoliberal 
thinkers; particularly Mises and Friedman. On top of the roles proposed by 




justice, the regulation of monopoly2, and the provision of key services ill-suited to 
the free-market; Keynes argued for extended public works and employment, 
responsible usury laws, the monetary control of inflation and interest, fiscal 
adjustments for stability and stimulation, and the socialisation of investment.  
Public works and employment are said to be most salient in times of 
recession as a means of stimulating demand in the economy. This is when private 
employment and investment are at their lowest, and when the Keynesian 
multiplier effect3 has the largest impact. 
Responsible usury laws are promoted in opposition to classical (excluding 
Smith) and laissez-faire economists who claim interest rates will find a natural 
equilibrium with employment and production. Keynes argues that this confuses 
interest with the marginal efficacy of capital. He claims that an unchecked interest 
rate will rise against gravity, disincentivising investment and incentivising saving 
rather than consumption; resulting in reduced production, demand and 
employment, and thus contractionary conditions.  
In international relations, Keynes argued against the gold standard as it 
sets nations against one another in competition for gold, and ties exchange and 
interest rates to their gold stocks. Instead, he argued for “a national investment 
programme directed to an optimum level of domestic employment” (Keynes, 
1936. P.311) claiming that “if nations can learn to provide themselves with full 
employment by their domestic policy (and, we must add, if they can also attain 
equilibrium in the trend of their population), there need be no important economic 
forces calculated to set the interest of one country against that of its neighbours” 
(Keynes, 1936. P.339). However, as will be shown in the next section, his views 
 
2 Depending on which classical liberals he is taken to be expanding on. 
3 The Keynesian multiplier explains “how fluctuations in the amount of investment, which are a 
comparatively small proportion of the national income, are capable of generating fluctuations in 
aggregate employment and income so much greater than themselves” (Keynes, 1936. P.108-9). 
Where “the increment of aggregate demand is equal to the product of the increment of 
aggregate investment and the multiplier as determined by the marginal propensity to consume” 
(Keynes, 1936. P.110). 
  Put basically, it is the theory that increased employment (thus increased marginal 
propensity to consume on a macro scale) multiplies the effectiveness of investments by 
increasing demand, and thus earnings, and thus further third-party income, employment and still 
further demand. it leads to the premise that state investment and employment, especially during 
recession, leads to increased consumption in the private sector, and thus revenues for further 
private investment, employment, and further demand still. Thus, state investment during 




on international development were further developed over the next six years from 
those included in his general theory.  
In 1942, and in anticipation of a post-war global economy, Keynes argued 
for an International Clearing Union which would, via a newly created and printed 
international currency, provide much-needed capital and coordinate exchange 
rates and monetary policy. This currency, dubbed the bancor, would have been 
traded by governments and central banks at fixed exchange rates. All international 
transactions would have passed through this institution and resulted in national 
deficits and credits of bancors. As a means of providing incentives to both creditor 
and debtor nations for maintaining global financial and trade balance, interest 
would be charged on account deficits, while a fine applied to account surpluses. 
The limits of deficit or surplus allowed to each nation would be in proportion to 
its share of world trade. On top of the interest or fines charged, minor breaches 
would result in optional currency revaluations (depreciation for deficits, 
appreciation for surpluses) in order to stimulate spending, investment, 
employment and thus growth in the deficit nations, while diverting it from those 
in surplus. In instances of recurring deficits or surpluses, Keynes’ clearing union 
would enforce higher interests and fines, compulsory currency revaluations, 
compulsory gold sales, and capital export controls (Steil, 2013. P.145).         
 It was thought that this would produce several beneficial outcomes. As 
Steil put them: 
“First, he argued, bancor would have international acceptability, 
and therefore render unnecessary major irritants such as blocked balances 
(inconvertible holdings of foreign currency) and bilateral clearing 
agreements (import discrimination to balance trade between pairs of 
countries). Second, bancor would facilitate an orderly mechanism for 
controlling the relative exchange values of different national currencies, 
and therefore dissuade countries from undertaking beggar-thy neighbor 
competitive devaluations. Third, bancor would be a much less capricious 
global money than gold. The monetary gold supply was determined by 
unhelpful factors such as changes in mining technology and the vagaries 
of national gold reserve policies, whereas bancor supply would be 
governed by the actual needs of global commerce as well as technocratic 




tendencies in effective global demand. Fourth, creditors as well as debtors 
would be pressured to take corrective action to reduce imbalances. The 
mechanism of fining creditors was one of the many novel features of the 
plan [. …] Fifth, the creation of bancor provided a mechanism for starting 
each country off after the war with a stock of reserves appropriate to its 
contribution to world commerce, without which many countries would be 
unwilling to liberalise policy for fear of imminent payments crisis. Finally, 
the creation of the institution of the ICB [International Clearing Bank] 
would take the destructive politics out of “the planning and regulation of 
the world’s economic life” (Steil, 2013. P.144-5). 
 
 Keynes challenged three key assumptions of the classical liberal doctrine. 
They are:  
“(1) that the real wage is equal to the marginal disutility of the existing 
employment; 
(2) that there is no such thing as involuntary unemployment in the strict 
sense; 
(3) that supply creates its own demand in the sense that the aggregate 
demand price is equal to the aggregate supply price for all levels of 
output and employment.” (Keynes, 1936. P.20). 
 It was the recognition of this that led Keynes to develop his brilliantly 
radical alternative to the classical and neoliberal doctrines. In their failure to 
address the imperfection of markets and the unlikeliness of reaching a natural 
equilibrium; their failure to address or even recognise the issue of involuntary 
unemployment; and their failure to address the issues surrounding wage prices, 
claiming equilibrium will be reached between supply and demand; Mises and 
Friedman both make these fallacious assumptions. Hayek, on the other hand, 
recognises these issues and makes solid efforts to amend them. 
  
Before we move into section two which focusses on the practical 
implementation of these theories, or at least of policy based on them, it is 
important to view the thoughts of two more economists. The first is Harry White. 
His thoughts on international relations which entail the roles of states are the only 




 Harry White developed his own blueprint for post-war economic recovery 
and integration. Developed between 1942 and 1944, and in fierce competition and 
debate with Keynes, his blueprint proposed a global funding institution which 
would, via fixed exchange rates and conditional lending, assure global economic 
stability. The U.S Dollar would be fixed to gold and all other members would fix 
their exchange rate to the Dollar.  
A key function of the fund would be to cover balance of payments deficits. 
To do this, member nations would be permitted to borrow Dollars or buy other 
currencies from the fund. This would be done so long as the borrowing nation 
could provide collateral in the form of gold or other currencies.  
Membership would, of course be conditional. In order to join nations 
would have to “pledge to abandon, within one year after joining the fund, all 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions with other member countries; not to 
alter exchange rates without the fund’s consent; not to engage in discriminatory 
bilateral clearing or exchange rate arrangements with other members; and 
gradually but continually to reduce import tariffs and other trade barriers” (Steil, 
2013. P.134). In addition to these conditions, any monetary or price setting 
policies considered by members would need approval by the fund and could be 
blocked by a four-fifths majority vote of other members.  
Members would also be obliged to block capital flows for investment (as 
opposed to trade) as these were seen to both aid the wealthy in evading tax and 
social responsibilities at home, and as destabilising to both national and global 
economies. 
Import subsidies were to be allowed while fund consent would be needed 
for export subsidies (Steil, 2013). 
This eclectic mixture of policy enforcement may seem odd, and a 
consistent logic may appear absent when looking for the good it might do 
globally. To find the logic of it, one must view White as a fervent nationalist who 
had, in his blueprint, attempted to secure the greatest possible U.S economic and 
geopolitical power gains as possible. His golden Dollar ensured the U.S would 
hold and control the dominant currency. The fund’s policy enforcements were 
designed to protect and expand its export-based trade interests, while its voting 
bias (inherent to White’s gold holdings-based quota system) ensured it could veto 




Furthermore, the U.S held a dominant two-thirds of global gold stores, 
while the war-torn world was desperate for capital to reconstruct their decimated 
infrastructure and rebuild their economies. Most were in no position to question 
the fine print above the dotted line that gained access to it. 
 
 
1.3: 20th Century Neoclassicism and Mixed Market 
Economies  
 
Both Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman studied at the University of 
Chicago during their undergraduate years and both studied under Frank Knight 
among others. However, both took their thoughts and careers in very different 
ways, each being hugely successful and influential in the field of economics. 
Samuelson is possibly the most influential economist of the 20th century 
and has been credited for integrating limited aspects of Keynesianism into the 
neoclassical synthesis. This, along with welfare economics, provides the basis of 
the modern mixed economy in which “markets direct the detailed activities of day 
to day economic life while government regulates social conditions and provides 
pensions, health care, and other necessities for poor families” (Samuelson, 2009. 
P.40). 
Fed up with the economic debates of the early 20th century, particularly 
their lack of empirical evidence and sound logic; Samuelson set out to create a 
theorem based in mathematics which would offer a level of scientific analysis yet 
unknown to economists. His Foundations of Economic Analysis was published in 
1947, and his textbook, simply titled Economics was first published in 1948 and 
sold over four million copies over 19 editions through to 2009. The last six 
editions were revised by William Nordhaus. These works represent but a fraction 
of his vast contributions to the field of economics. It would be impossible to 
review his collection in the timeframe available, and anyone who has in any 
timeframe must be commended.  
Samuelson claimed that “economics best serves the public interest in using 
cool heads to inform warm hearts” (Samuelson, 2009. P323). By this is meant that 
the focus of economic studies ought to be the analysis of real cause and effect 




information economists can provide advice on the actual, or at least an accurate 
range of potential implications of economic policy proposals. Discerned here are 
his broad perspectives of our five key issues through a careful reading of these 
two works.  
On equality, Samuelson promoted the incentivising nature of unequal 
competition but made several concessions. He defended Keynesian demand-side 
economics fervently, extending the mathematics of the Keynesian multiplier, and 
touting its ability to both stimulate economies during a recession, thereby 
increasing the stability of market economies, and also its propensity to increase 
equality. But he went further than this for the goals of equality and the 
stabilisation of demand and supply.  
Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) includes in-depth discussions of 
the existing discourse in welfare economics. The basic argument presented is that 
perfectly competitive markets provide the most for all; that they provide the most 
efficient4 means of production and distributions of goods, incomes and wealth. 
However, he notes that today economies are imperfect, oligopolistic and 
monopolistic. Thus, the supply and demand curves of most industries are 
distorted, prices are higher, and the equality of income and wealth reduced.  
With little hope of restoring perfect competition to the global economy, 
and indeed, by bestowing virtues such as increased innovation on big business 
that would be unaffordable by any business the scale of which would be found in 
a perfectly competitive market; Samuelson creates a platform for the mixed 
market economy, including third-way formulations espoused by the likes of 
Giddens5 (1994, 2000) (Romano, 2006). These virtues, and the implications for 
the populace of any nation which downsized its main industries, Samuelson 
claims, warrants the existence of large-scale industries and huge companies. 
 
4 Samuelson, unlike other market fundamentalists, gave an explicit definition of what he meant 
by efficiency. He claims that “an economy is producing efficiently when it cannot increase the 
economic welfare of anyone without making someone else worse off” (Samuelson, 2009. P.30).   
5 Note that although third-way formulations such as Gidden’s, which were touted as a new 
compromise between neoliberal and social democratic extremes, are predominantly founded on 
neoclassical austerity and supply-side economics, and thus provide little differentiation to 
neoclassical formulations. It has been claimed (Harris, 1999; Meeropol, 2000) that the third-way 
was adopted by the traditional leftist parties to gain voter support as popular sentiment had 





However, he also states that the inefficiencies in wealth and income distribution 
and subsequent inequalities must be addressed. 
Special privileges in the mixed market economy include exorbitant 
incomes for CEOs, celebrities, and top professionals, particularly those in finance, 
as well as potentially lucrative rewards for investors who put their personal capital 
to use. On the other hand, privileges are also extended to the poor, elderly and 
disabled in the form of welfare payments (less-so in third-way formulations), 
special grants for people in particular circumstances, subsidised or free healthcare 
and education programs, food stamps and accommodation allowances.  
True to form, Samuelson neglects any personal preferences regarding the 
specificities of any mixture of these, discussing instead the implications of each 
and leaving people to form their own conclusions and decide policy through 
democratic procedure. He does, however, stress that it is beneficial in several 
ways to reduce the inequality gap and support those who are unable to support 
themselves to an acceptable level.  
As far as monopoly goes, Samuelson repeatedly imbues the benefits of 
perfect competition upon his readers. Alas, as stated, he continuously makes 
practical concessions with imperfect forms of competition.  
Monopolistic and oligopolistic industries are seen as an inefficient means 
of providing public goods. This is because prices tend to rise, through 
monopolistic power or collusion, above the natural equilibrium of supply and 
demand. This, in turn, restricts access of a portion of would-be consumers to the 
product in question for the financial benefit of corporate owners. According to 
Samuelson, these inefficient forms of production, distribution and accumulation 
occur when one or more companies gain a size advantage over the industry norm. 
This allows them a comparative advantage of cost reduction by buying 
components and materials in bulk and streamlining procedures. This advantage 
allows them to undercut competitors while returning similar profits per piece. As 
such, they attract more consumers, damaging their competition and securing large 
market shares.   
Once the competition has been diminished, these companies, with their 
new monopolistic or oligarchic control, can begin to raise prices for their own 




operations and can be bought out via a merger or acquisition, or simply crushed in 
another round of price wars. It will be noted that this is one of the forms of 
monopoly neglected by Friedman. 
Samuelson points out, that “In addition to declining costs, other forces 
leading to imperfect competition are barriers to entry in the form of legal 
restrictions (such as patents or government regulation), high entry costs, 
advertising, and product differentiation.” (Samuelson, 2009. P.185)  
The question of regulation brings us to the role of the state. The state 
serves many roles in the mixed market economy. These include progressive and 
redistributive tax systems, and public spending on things like justice, defence, 
welfare, roading, education and healthcare. They also include fiscal and monetary 
adjustments to stabilise the economy, and the maintenance of international 
political and economic relations which facilitate international trade in the private 
sector. Furthermore, they regulate undesirable business practices and 
inefficiencies through anti-trust law and direct regulation of wage prices, working 
conditions, and damaging environmental practices. They also offer incentives and 
disincentives for desirable and undesirable practices respectively. 
In international relations, Samuelson’s preferences are clear: free trade 
between appropriately regulated national mixed market economies based 
primarily on neoclassical economics. This includes the breaking down of tariffs 
(considered political tools to insure the votes of particular groups of society), and 
other barriers to trade, as well as the increased opening of borders to capital, trade, 
and the movement of human labour. 
 
 
1.4: Section Conclusions 
 
Section one has given a brief historical narrative of the key developments 
in liberal economics since the 1930s. It began by juxtaposing Mises, Hayek and 
Friedman.  
It was discovered that Mises’ arguments were founded on assumptions 
incompatible with reality, from which key premises of his argument, and thus, 




unequal and thought equality ought only to be sought through policy which 
allowed individuals equal freedoms to pursue their own ends. No special 
privileges were to be had in the eyes of Mises, and he went to great lengths to 
disprove the notions that owners of the means of production held a privileged 
position in society. Competition was to be the sole regulator of monopoly, except 
in instances where monopolists held control of a natural resource, in which case 
exorbitant profits might be taxed. The role of the state “consists solely and 
exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private 
property against violent attacks” (Mises, 1927. P.52). No further regulation or 
organisation was needed on a global scale, so long as all states adhered to his 
prescriptions, fulfilling their national roles. 
 
As well as sharing detrimental assumptions with Mises, Friedman was 
found to espouse a shallow, face value, dogmatic, and deceptive logic. His 
fallacious position, developed within the Chicago schools of economics and law, 
would be taught and spread through several academic, political, and legal works, 
culminating in the Friedmanite neoliberal ideology as defined. 
Equality of outcome was seen as impractical and undesirable, though he 
did argue, in part, for equality of opportunity while promoting state subsidised 
private schooling and private investment in human capital. Friedman was anti all 
special treatment, whether justified on grounds of race, equality, gender, religion 
or profession. Monopoly was of exaggerated importance, that is while he 
considered healthy competition the ideal, he defended unregulated private 
monopoly wholeheartedly and in the opinion of this reader, neglected to mention 
the most relevant arguments against it. The state’s role, in Friedman’s eyes, is to 
set the rules of the game, moderate differing interpretations of said rules and 
enforce them upon individuals. His theory, like Mises’, held no differentiation 
between national and international policy prescriptions.   
  
The nuanced writings of Hayek were surprisingly responsible and well 
measured. They stand clearly defined from the alternate neoliberal writings of 
Friedman, but also from earlier neoliberals such as Mises, and classical liberals as 
well. It must be said that Hayek promoted a much more desirable, equal and stable 




model. Some difficulty was had in critiquing the Road to Serfdom in the 
politically philosophic context of comparing the narrow areas of importance to 
this thesis. It is a shame that those critical of the global economy’s trajectory after 
the Bretton Woods era are so quick to lump Hayek in with Friedman and his 
disciples. He must be read and critiqued on his own merits. 
Hayek was a keen supporter of equality of opportunity, going as far as to 
question exorbitant inheritances. He made allowances for the inherent instability 
of markets, promoting public works to provide employment in areas where private 
enterprise is impractical or undesirable, but which serve purposes widely 
beneficial to society. Monopoly in all forms is considered undesirable and can be 
averted through regulation and monetary policy which disadvantages the 
monopolist against his competitors. State intervention is promoted for the 
regulation and stabilising of the economy and society, as well as providing goods 
and services ill-suited to the private market. He promoted an international 
federation to oversee politico-economic relations, ensuring peace, stability, and 
fairness in international relations, while remaining explicitly against any solely 
economic international institutions without political regulation of the same or 
higher standing.  
 
Keynes critique, that like the classical liberals of the 19th century, 
neoliberal theory rested on fallacious assumptions also capture Mises and 
Friedman, the latter of whom was writing decades after its publishing. Hayek 
however, recognised these assumptions and made amends for them in The Road to 
Serfdom. 
Keynes went beyond equality of opportunity, going so far as to promote 
redistributive measures to equalise income and wealth, while via these and rigid 
wage policy, providing a strong consumer base to stimulate demand. Keynes 
preference for perfect competition is known, however, he crafted his theory to 
work in conditions of perfect or imperfect competition and writes little on 
monopoly in the General Theory. The Keynesian state serves several functions. 
These include both monetary and fiscal controls, responsible usury laws, wage 
regulations, and the provision of public works and employment, especially in 
times of recession. His international clearing union would have, via an 




well as incentives for stable and fair trade and disincentives for greedy practices; 
contributed to a stable and mutually equitable international economy.   
 
White, on the other hand, promoted an international system of fixed 
exchange fiat currencies attached to a gold exchangeable U.S dollar. The 
institution of choice to oversee international affairs was the IMF which would 
lend to nations provided conditional policy reforms were implemented.   
 
Samuelson offers the mixed market economy based predominantly on 
neoclassical economics but compromised with limited aspects of Keynesianism. 
Admitting the imperfection of markets, he avoids the fallacious assumptions of 
earlier neoliberals and cleverly employs Keynes’ fiscal ingenuities and demand-
side economics to fill the gaping void. He also makes hugely beneficial 
contributions to equality and stability with the addition of welfare economics and 
the development of the welfare state in a mixed market economy. Alas, he misses 
some of the most important contributions of both Hayek and Keynes on 
international relations, and the global monetary system. He chooses instead to 
adhere to the status quo of the Bretton Woods and Marshal plan institutions as 
they have developed since their conception.    
 
Similarities between Friedman and Samuelson can be explained through 
their shared links to the (pre-perspective shift) Chicago school of economics. The 
foundations they developed there persisted throughout their careers and can be 
seen in their shared promotion of monetarism, however, the two ended up worlds 
apart. Friedman followed a neoliberal bent, following the likes of Mises into 
laissez-faire style minimal governance and extreme market fundamentalism. 
Samuelson, on the other hand, incorporated Keynesian fiscalism and government 
intervention into his own neoclassical synthesis. Both set him apart from 
Friedman, while the fiscalism and the demand-side motives for it set him apart 
from Hayek. Hayek also subscribed to the monetarism that neoliberals carried 
over from neoclassical thinkers, but he was a strong proponent of government 
intervention and public works, though public works were promoted for welfare 
rather than fiscal stimulation. It is the incorporation of demand-side economics 




from the neoliberals. His acknowledgement of the imperfection of markets and 
avoidance of classical assumptions further separates him from Friedman but 
draws him nearer to more nuanced neoliberals like Hayek. It is easy to see how 
people have included Samuelson into the neoliberal fold, but the perspective 
presented here distinguishes them by their inclusion/exclusion of demand side 
fiscalism. 
Keynes sits well to the left of all three. His collectivist labour unions, his 
downplaying of monetarism, and the extremity of his demand-side fiscalism (of 
which Samuelson included to a limited degree) including the extensive promotion 
of public employment are the major defining features on a national scale.   
 
Section one has outlined and contrasted key aspects of the most relevant 
scholar’s works in order to emphasise the ideological blueprints for national and 
international development contained within. This provides the basis of the major 
themes and provides a platform for further evolution in the following sections. 
Section two now explores the practical post-war developments, focusing 
on those in the U.S and their distorted reflections in the U.K. This will 
demonstrate how individual agency, class compromise (or non-compromise), 
geopolitical motives, and economic incentives shift the course of history and lead 
to the implementation of ideological policy based on but divergent from the 
prominent scholarly theories of the time. This will satisfy the first theme and 
provide building blocks for the second theme (third section) in the form of four 
distinct eras of capitalist development, three of which are clearly linked to the 









Section 2: From Ideology to Practice: Models of Development at 
Work 
 
We turn now to an analysis of the practical implementation of these 
theoretical models in compromise with each other, and other political and 
economic considerations. The focus of this section is on practical development in 
the U.S and U.K. It tracks the development of capitalism from the Bretton Woods 
agreement based on the compromises between Keynes and White, through a 
period of decline which saw a huge rise in speculative capitalism, and into the 
neoliberal era based mostly in the writings of Friedman but compromised with 
supply-side economics and geopolitical concerns. It then explores developments 
in these two countries within the neoliberal era and follows the move to more 
moderate neoclassical models as capsulated in the work of Samuelson. 
By doing so section three demonstrates the national implementation of 
practical models of development. It shows how these vary nation to nation in 
compromise with existing political, social and economic considerations and 
opposing perspectives.  
It shows the national and international progression from ideological 
blueprints to practical models of development through debate, compromise, and 
the tactical positioning of intellectuals and advocates, thereby delivering on the 
first major theme. It also distinguishes three eras of capitalism with distinct 
models of development and paves the way to section three’s analysis of similar 
developments within the supra-national institutions which facilitate and guide the 
global economy.  
 
 
2.1: The Bretton Woods Era 
 
The classical liberal New Deal struck in 1933 was influenced by the 
economic philosophy and earlier writings of Keynes’ (previous to The General 
Theory). It involved a form of corporate market rule which, via organised labour, 
well defined managerial hierarchies, and strong state welfare programs, achieved 
a stable class compromise and hegemonic legitimacy. Production and 




production… more money… more production) cycle of capital where value-
adding production leads to increased capital through profit which in turn 
facilitates increased production (Van Der Pijl & Yurchenko, 2015).  
The national template, resembling the work of Keynes, incorporated 
union-led collectivist bargaining for wage prices and working conditions. This 
facilitated said stable class compromise and maintained an acceptable level of 
equality. The template also incorporated strong industries focused predominantly 
on the domestic markets, which were driven by strong consumption, itself fuelled 
by high levels of well-paid employment. In order to maintain consumption and 
thus the strong industries which relied on it, the state engaged in multiple projects 
for societal betterment, via their funding through private companies, or in some 
countries and cases, state-owned enterprises. The economy was based on demand-
side economics and incorporated fiscal controls and stimulation.  
These ideas were followed in the wake of WW11 at the Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944 and largely prevailed through discussion to remain the basis of 
the Bretton Woods era’s national template. However, the post-war international 
framework received a make-over, and not one of Keynes’ prescribing. We focus 
here on the pre-conference drafting sessions in Atlanta, and the main conference 
at Bretton Woods. 
 
While Keynes led the charge in two years of correspondence and debate 
about the post-war economic situation, mostly with White, it had become clear by 
June 1944, that White and the U.S intended to play hardball with Keynes’ 
blueprint.  
The politics coming into the pre-conference drafting saw Keynes and the 
Brits knowing full well that they were going to have to make concessions with the 
U.S delegation if they were to maintain any favourable course after the war. The 
facts were that their empty coffers, large responsibilities to their colonies, and 
huge U.S debt through land-lease left them little negotiating power. In the 
knowledge that he would be making large concessions no matter what, Keynes 
conceded largely to White’s International monetary fund, attempting to make 
slight but important changes to it, while insisting on the creation of a second 
institution to perform some of the tasks of his proposed clearing union, namely 




gentlemen’s agreement that they were to reach, through formal and informal 
negotiations during the drafting and at Bretton Woods mutually beneficial 
arrangements for Britain and the U.S.  
White, however, was not such a gentleman. He had hand-picked a team of 
technocrats for the conferences, informed them of his plan to bulldoze over any 
opposition to a U.S biased monetary system (particularly Keynes’ blueprint), and 
trained them to defeat the arguments that might be put forward against his own. 
Meanwhile, he actively deceived Congress and his superiors, leaving them 
uninformed, or falsely assuring them that he and Keynes had reached agreeable 
terms (Steil, 2013).  
During pre-conference drafting in Atlanta, several issues arose between 
Keynes and White surrounding the IMF.  
Keynes argued for greater national flexibility for nations to adjust their 
exchange rates, and he re-drafted Article iv to this effect. White flatly refused, 
claiming that this was incompatible with the IMF’s function and that if insisted 
on, “it would be impossible to reach an agreement” (Keynes, 1980. P.65. Cited in 
Steil, 2013. P.194). Both, however, argued against the free-floating exchange rates 
proposed by neoliberal writers at the time. 
As for the period of transition into fund obligations, Keynes argued again 
for increased flexibility. Nations he claimed, should be the judges of their own 
readiness to adopt these obligations into policy, and the Fund should be lenient in 
so far as they are making progressive changes toward these ends. White remained 
adamant that a strict three-year adjustment period was all that was required. 
“Keynes declared his position final, and threatened to break off negotiations. 
White simply changed the subject, choosing to bide his time until the conference, 
where he could isolate Keynes and resolve the issue on his own” (Steil, 2013. 
P.195). 
The definitions of gold convertible currency and convertible exchange 
caused further disputes. Keynes saw that were the dollar the sole currency 
exchangeable for gold, and others exchangeable for dollars which were needed to 
trade in gold stocks, that the U.S would reap many economic benefits. These 
included increased demand for the dollar, making it an internationally traded 




economic wellbeing of the U.S6; and the ability to offset trade deficits by printing 
money. Keynes argued that the dollar ought to hold no special privileges over 
other currencies which would reach value par one day and become convertible for 
gold. The issue was once again diverted to the conference (Steil, 2013). 
 
Keynes was well aware, by the end of the pre-conference drafting in 
Atlanta, that White had cleverly set them up to legitimise his brushing aside of 
international concerns by claiming that forty-four countries had come together and 
crafted a new economic order. However, he naively believed himself to be in the 
inner circle, in a position above those to be swept aside. He was wrong. 
At Bretton Woods Keynes was quickly put in charge of commission two, 
and thus negotiations concerning the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development which he had emphatically insisted on in previous discourse. This 
served two main purposes. It put a great mind at the helm of a globally beneficial 
project which had zero potential to harm U.S interests, and it both soothed 
Keynes’ ego and kept him distracted, allowing White, head of commission one, to 
focus on the IMF where his true agenda lay. 
With Keynes out of the picture, it fell to the other British delegates to 
negotiate the terms of the IMF articles. However, like the government back home, 
they were under the impression that Keynes and White had struck accordance on 
agreeable terms. This misconception led them (a) into thinking that the matter of 
gold convertibility had been settled in Atlanta, and (b) to British delegate 
Robinson defending the golden dollar and the definitions of gold convertible 
currency and convertible exchange against an Indian questioner. He described 
them as unimportant terms with little practical relevance, the definitions of which 
bore more debate than the practicalities merited. White gleefully accepted his 
argument and moved on to the next item on the agenda (Steil, 2013). 
 
6 In fact, much of today’s tension between China and the U.S is based around this, and the 
pursuant mutual entrapment of the two economies. China, todays largest creditor nation has 
switched roles with the U.S, while the U.S is in a similar position to Britain in 1944; that is one of 
recurring balance deficits and waning international economic might, along with a heavy reliance 
on the world’s largest creditor, China. However, todays circumstances see China unable to crush 
the U.S empire financially due to a) extreme losses in its extensive U.S holdings, b) The loss of the 
U.S as a market of last resort and large importer of Chinese goods, c) the lack of desperation (as 
caused by WW11 in Britain) in the U.S to give up their imperialistic ways and succumb to an 
agenda which removes their global hegemony and protects China’s U.S interests, and d) to the 
complexity and nigh inconceivability of any viable agenda which seeks these outcomes peacefully 




White subsequently moved the item on to the drafting committee 
(comprised of himself and his hand-picked team of U.S technocrats), 
“strategically replacing “gold” with “gold and U.S dollars” throughout the 96-
page Final Act. [This] would become an important part of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement [, making gold and the dollar nigh synonymous]. Keynes would only 
discover them after his departure from Bretton Woods” (Steil, 2013. P.216). 
Keynes didn’t get the opportunity to challenge further the issues he had 
with White’s blueprint. In fact, there is very little of Keynes’ intellectual prowess 
to be found in the international relations aspects of the Bretton Woods agreement, 
even though the period following is often referred to as the Keynesian era, and the 
practices followed as Keynesian. The Keynesian national template followed 
widely in the Bretton woods era; the labour unions, wage protection, public 
works, and generally the demand-side economics that led to them; were all 
movements before the war and are more associable with the 1933 new deal, which 
both White and Keynes supported, than Bretton Woods. The Bretton Woods 
conferences were more about international than national economies, and the 
Keynesian template was carried over to provide a stable platform for growth and 
trade. 
Keynes’ World Bank negotiations were reportedly a madhouse (Steil, 
2013), and perhaps this contributed to the institution struggling for purpose early 
on, along with the Marshal plan which greatly undermined it of course. The IMF 
was all White, although the final name was suggested by Keynes long before 
Bretton Woods.   
Keynes’ optimism for his clearing union and two-year intellectual battle 
for the realisation of his vision for post-war international relations were in vain. 
His superior wisdom and intellect were pushed aside by the bullish ambition of 
White, backed by the geopolitical and economic might of the U.S at the time. 
Indeed, many of Keynes’ concerns were proven to be well placed. The lack of 
exchange flexibility has been blamed for economic crises including the financial 
collapse of Argentina in 2001 (Williamson, 2009); while the golden Dollar 
created a system reliant on the U.S.’s ability to purchase and sell gold at a fixed 
price. Keynes saw this ahead of Bretton Woods but was brushed aside. As will be 
seen, it was the U. S’s default, brought about by several factors, that ultimately led 




Ironically, the ideas of Keynes live on today and have made an inspiring 
come back. Contemporary economists such as Paul Samuelson, Paul Krugman, 
Joseph Stiglitz and Anthony Giddens have incorporated his wisdom and 
intellectual might into their own works, and through their influence, it has been 
re-incorporated into global and national policy.  
  
 It was, however, the ideas of White which were articulated, implemented 
and disseminated to western Europe and Japan. Exchange rates were fixed to the 
American dollar, which was attached to gold. Two institutions, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were established to aid nations struggling under fixed 
exchange rates. The IMF became a lender of last resort while the IBRD was to 
fund reconstruction and development in war-torn countries.  
This system ushered in over two decades of stable growth to the North 
Atlantic and Japan, but it came at a burdensome cost to the U.S. By 1960 there 
was a huge but waning international demand for American dollars to support 
liquidity and foreign growth, however, supplying this money required reoccurring 
balance of payments (BOP) deficits in the U.S. These deficits were, through the 
late 1950s and 1960s, key to the stability of the Bretton Woods monetary system 
(Collins, 1996). They were, of course, unsustainable and resulted in a loss of 
confidence in the American dollar, which then caused an increasing desire of 
foreign nations and banks to convert held dollars for U.S gold. This created a 
catch 22 where measures to save dollars and lower the BOP deficits risked 
plunging the world into a liquidity shortage and recession as nations clung to less 
fluid gold rather than currency; while continuing the BOP deficits came at the cost 
of U.S gold reserves, which depleted the collateral holdings for the dollars in 
circulation, especially as the U.S printed money to cover its trade deficits (Collins, 
1996; Steil, 2013).  
A mild recession engineered by Eisenhower via a budget surplus restored 
faith in the dollar and maintained stability for a few more years. But through the 
mid to late-1960s foreign exports, particularly those of more coordinated market 
economies such as Japan and Germany, were beginning to outcompete those of 
the U.S and national production was declining along with demand. This coupled 




U.S.A. (Vietnam was at its fiercest), and costly international Aid programs; saw 
the BOP deficit reach a reckless high at around four billion Dollars in 1968 This, 
along with remaining pressure from a tax-cut in 1964, would drive inflation 
dangerously high to 4.4 percent in 1968. The U.S economy’s ability to support the 
global monetary system came into question (Collins, 1996. P.401). 
Calls were made for a tax hike, but due to public discouragement, 
president Johnson was unwilling to implement them (Collins, 1996). They began 
looking for other ways to lower the deficit while retaining the military budget, 
hence welfare and social spending began to be seen, as they were in Friedmanite 
neoliberal theory (despite Samuelson’s role as presidential advisor7), as a drain on 
society, and unionised wage prices and class compromises were increasingly 
perceived as a hindrance to U.S industry (Gould, 2013). Then, in November 1967 
Britton announced a 14.3 percent devaluation of the Pound Sterling in the wake of 
speculative currency attacks. This increased the already high demand for gold 
(Russia had been hoarding it and Industrial use in electronic components was 
growing faster than gold production) and created instability in the financial and 
gold markets.  
The international gold pool (held by the U.S and eight other allied nations) 
“incurred losses of $641 million (of which the U.S share was 59 percent)” in the 
seven days following November 20th (Collins, 1996. P.405). The U.S attempted to 
maintain international confidence in the dollar, pledging to keep the price at 
Thirty-five dollars an ounce, and urging other nations to maintain their fixed 
exchange rates. This kept the gold price stable, but it was almost in vain. By mid-
March in 1968 confidence in the Dollar and the U.S economy had waned again, 
leading to a speculative run on gold and unprecedented losses from the Gold pool; 
climbing to daily losses of almost $400 million, with losses for March running 
toward a billion (Collins, 1996). The U.S called for the closing of gold markets 
and invited finance ministers and central bankers from gold pool countries to an 
emergency meeting.  
As a result, a new two-tier system of gold trading was introduced by which 
nations traded gold for the purposes of liquidity at the traditional $35 per pound, 
 
7 Recall that Samuelson is both a neoclassicist and a proponent of welfare economics. It is unclear 
what his position on these topics was in his advisory role, but his academic writings would 




while private sale prices became set by supply and demand. As well as this, 
Special Drawing Rights were implemented through the IMF as a platform of 
trading gold and creating liquidity which did not actually involve the trading of 
gold. In this it was almost a nod toward Keynes’ bancor. Furthermore, the U.S 
removed its national legal obligation to cover 25% of paper currency by gold 
reserves (Collins, 1996). On top of these global measures, Johnson finally 
approved tax raises, and while these measures bought the global system time, they 
ultimately proved to be too little too late.  
The U.S BOP fell back into heavy deficits as the result of a stagflation in 
production and further harsh competition, particularly from Germany and Japan 
who had never fully embraced the collectiveness (under U.S hegemony) of the 
Bretton Woods system. Thus, it became evident that the system could no longer 
be propped up by the U.S, and that it was no longer in the U.S’s best interests to 
either prop it up or be a part of it. Thus, at the recommendation of Paul Volker 
(who would later become president of the federal reserve), the dollar was detached 
from gold in 1971, and by 1973 floating exchange rates were reintroduced 
(Collins, 1996).  
 
Total dollars in circulation grew exponentially. This triggered increased 
finance and a global flood of “both interest-bearing money-capital tied to value 
creation [(C)] and money-dealing capital [(Cm)]” (Van Der Pijl & Yurchenko, 
2015. P.501). It also upheld the Keynesian national template and class 
compromise after productivity increases had waned which temporarily gave a 
false legitimacy to the new economic liberalisations (Van Der Pijl & Yurchenko, 
2015).  
Firms began shifting production offshore to escape labour costs and reduce 
taxes, either by setting up factories and operations in other countries or 
outsourcing production and labour to external, foreign-owned manufacturers 
(Unni & Scaria, 2009). This was perhaps necessitated also by the need for the 
financial stability of interest-bearing (M…M’) circuits amongst speculative and 
increasingly unpredictable investment by money dealing capital (Cm), and 




This post-gold standard decline of the Bretton woods era8 demonstrated 
the destructive tendencies of speculative capital in volatile markets, an issue 
Keynes had predicted 37 years earlier. It is considered here a rather unique 
moment in history, the result of partially globalised, relatively unregulated, 
unstable and uncooperative market economies, and the frantically self-interested 
psychology of investors in such an environment9. This decline and dismantling of 
the Bretton Woods era and its international framework persisted through the mid-
1970s, with the worst symptoms lessoning as economies gained stability. It 
brought with it a new class compromise with a ‘rentier’ of propertied and invested 
middle classes at the cost of the working class. It is also characterised by 
increasingly interlocked corporate boards of directors (Van Der Pijl & Yurchenko, 
2015).  
The decline and gradual disassembly of the Bretton Woods system paved 
the way for others to implement radical ideas into new policy frameworks. This is 
particularly true for Britain and the U.S. 
 
 
2.2: Thatcherism: The Neoliberal Era in the U.K 
 
Thatcher’s 1979 Government waged war on organised labour and State-
owned enterprise (SOE). British Leyland and the British Steel Corporation (under 
Ian MacGregor) both underwent extensive and controversial ‘rationalisation’ 
reforms at the cost of 130,000 directly employed jobs (Barlow & Mortimer, 
2012). In the face of large-scale strikes, these reforms saw the introduction of 
direct balloting of employees; a piece of legislation which undermined the 
 
8 The U.S abandonment of the gold standard could be seen as the end of the Bretton Woods era 
and the beginning of an era of speculative or jungle capitalism, but it is seen here as a step in the 
decline of the Bretton Woods era and the dismantling of its international legal framework. This is 
because Keynes’ national template continued to struggle through the 1970s (albeit under 
ferocious attack and gradual disassembly by neoliberal advocates) until being replaced by the 
neoliberal template in the 1980s.  
9 It must be noted that speculative flows still play a huge and destabilizing role in today’s 
economies. However, the market conditions and speculative opportunities of the early 1970s 
have not been fully repeated. It is the relative stability (as opposed to actual stability) of markets 
achieved through academic progress and a degree of political wisdom which has prevented this 
historic moment from repeating. It is, in this writer’s mind, imperative that speculative 
investments be regulated on a global scale if capitalism is to find any sustainable equilibrium and 




cohesion and strength of organised labour in order to reduce picketing. The 
reforms culminated in the privatisation of both industries in 1988 (Barlow & 
Mortimer, 2012). In 1983 Thatcher had also set her sights on the coal industry and 
assigned her bulldog Ian MacGregor as head of the National Coal Board 
(www.bbc.co.uk/wales/history). The coal strikes of 1984-85 were deemed illegal 
through legislation changes and police were given new jurisdiction over picketers 
(Barlow & Mortimer, 2012. Turner, 1995). The coal Industry was finally 
privatised in the mid-1990s (www.bbc.co.uk/wales/history). Also privatised in 
Thatcher’s era were several water companies, British Airways, Britoil, Enterprise 
Oil, and British Gas10. Each of these was listed as Public Limited Companies 
(PLCs) and shares were sold for each company. There were also government 
boards and committees formed to regulate the negative effects of these known 
monopolies entering the private domain. This shows an important mid-point of 
practical Thatcherism between Hayekian and Friedmanite conceptions of 
neoliberal doctrine; that she, as a neoliberalist after Hayek, with roots in Adam 
Smith’s classical Liberalism, feared the effects of monopolisation but believed in 
the liberal freedoms and held an optimistic faith in market mechanisms which 
outweighed this concern (https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106680). It 
also highlights her practicality as a human who saw the impracticalities of 
breaking the SOEs up for sale, and the inefficiency of running and coordinating 
such essential industries as water and energy when provided by companies 
without national, or at least regional reach. This style of privatisation formed a 
template for other nations in the North Atlantic and beyond, especially where 
socialism had a strong history. For others such as the USA, other paths awaited.  
    
 
2.3: Reaganomics: The Neoliberal Era in the U.S   
 
While they both followed broadly neoliberal approaches, i.e. monetarist 
and austerity economics; it was the Chicago school’s influence, particularly 
around austerity economics and antitrust laws which set the U.K and U.S.A apart 
 
10 Several questions of control after privatization remain unanswered for this writer, but these 





early on. However, the U.K would later align more to Friedmanite neoliberalism, 
it simply had different pre-existing conditions and social and political 
compromises to navigate.  
The U.S.A, having no history of socialism, already housed a network of 
interconnected privately owned corporations, an entrenched national capitalist 
class (NCC) whose profit maximising interests lay in overriding the fair and 
equitable policy laid down by former congresses, and a national elite (NE) or 
inner circle of the fractionalised NCC who held similar views which varied in 
important ways. The NCC and NE, consisting of the owners and executives of 
corporations, operated and compromised amongst themselves through a network 
of representative think tanks, policy planning, and lobbying groups to advise and 
direct policy shifts before, during and after the Reagan administration. Beyond the 
NE, the NCC of the Reagan period was fractionalised into an ‘old money’ fraction 
tied to the NE or inner circle of national capitalists via interlocking corporate 
directorates and ownership, ivy league and elitist educational institutions and 
elitist social clubs whose support shifted from Keynesianism to Austerity 
economics through the 1970s and early 1980s; and a ‘new money’ fraction11 of 
entrepreneurial led corporations in growth industries particularly in the sunbelt 
regions, who were isolated from the institutions and political access of the 
traditional capitalist class and tended to support supply-side economics. It was 
through the above-mentioned network of conservative policy groups that these 
class fractions compromised between theoretical preferences, and a practical 
neoliberalism was born.  
Key to this network were the generally Austerity aligned American 
Enterprise Institute [AEI], Business Roundtable [BR], Hoover Institution, and 
Shadow Open Market Committee; as well as the generally supply-side oriented 
National Association of Manufacturers [NAM], the Chamber of Commerce 
[COCUS], the Heritage Foundation, and the Institute for Research on the 
Economics of Taxation (IRET) (Jenkins & Eckert, 1989). Within and between 
these groups, Austerity advocate scholars such as Milton Friedman (AEI; 
Chicago, MPS), Herbert Stein (staff at AEI; Chicago, MPS), Alan Greenspan 
(Hoover board), Alan Melzer (Shadow Committee coordinator; MPS), George 
 
11 The particular class groupings and fractions of any nation will vary and shift due to the 




Schultz (BR and CFR boards; Chicago, MPS), and Beryl Sprinkel (Shadow 
Committee member; Chicago, MPS); and supply-side proponents such as Charles 
Walker (Business Roundtable consultant), and Norman Ture (Heritage and AEI 
staff, and IRET President) debated and designed policy programs for the U.S.A 
(Jenkins & Eckert, 1989).  
It is interesting that the austerity camp was dominated by MPS members 
and scholars with intellectual links to the Chicago schools of law and economics, 
having either studied or taught there, (as displayed in brackets above). The 
multitude of Chicago influenced scholars in this network is probably due to the 
business leaders from the NE and ‘old money’ NCC faction who sat upon and 
commanded several of the groups boards of directors and were able to control 
membership and thus the perspectives present for debate, much like the Volker 
fund did with the early Chicago school projects. They also decided on the research 
programs these scholars could commit to, and thus loosely directed the direction 
and final perspectives reached by the scholars through academic debate (Jenkins 
& Eckert, 1989).  
 In 1979 Paul Volcker (not associated with the Volker fund), who had ties 
to both big business and the shadow open market committee (Jenkins & Eckert, 
1989) was appointed as chairman of the federal reserve. He increased both the 
federal and prime interest rates to induce a recession, reigning in inflation, causing 
the dollar’s exchange rate to spike, (Overbeek & Van Apeldoorn. 2012; Reinhart 
& Trebesch, 2016). and bringing C (interest bearing money) under the control of 
M (productive capital) (Van Der Pijl & Yurchenko, 2015). While this brought 
inflation and interest bearing money under control to the dismay of commercial 
banks, the simultaneous pressure put on developing nations to pay significantly 
increased interest on loans, coupled with the high price of dollars (which was the 
denominated currency of many loans) as well as austerity programs enforced by 
the IMF and WB, meant that internationally, large swathes of state-owned assets 
were sold on the open market, delighting investment bankers, feeding the 
predatory Cm money circuits (Van Der Pijl & Yurchenko, 2015), and creating a 
gap between commercial and investment bank accumulation that is yet to be 
closed. 
Ronald Reagan became the leading Republican candidate in 1980 after a 




the solution to Volcker’s recession. He was then approached by several corporate 
campaign funders and the above-mentioned policy organisations who offered their 
services to his candidacy (Jenkins & Eckert, 1989). Several advisory boards, 
comities, and even a tax policy task force were established as scholars from the 
various neoliberal groups, particularly supply-side12 and austerity13 theoreticians 
tried to smooth out their contradictions for practical implementation. The final and 
decisive installation being the Economic Policy Advisory Board made up of 
“three supply-siders (Arthur Laffer, Charles Walker and William Simon), seven 
austerity proponents (George Schultz, Martin Anderson [Hoover board], Arthur 
Burns, Milton Friedman, Herbert Stein, Paul McCracken, and Walter Wriston) 
and two ideological neutrals (James Lynn and Thomas Sowell [Hoover staff])” 
(Jenkins & Eckert, 1989. P.129).  
Finally, in his inaugural speech, Reagan announced his four pillars of 
economic ‘prosperity’; an austere and inherently contradictory mixture of supply-
side and Chicago school economics. He proposed enormous tax cuts, the top 
income bracket being cut from 70% to 28%, and corporate taxes being severely 
reduced also (Laffer, 2006). At the same time continuing the tight fiscal and 
monetary policy in the federal reserve which had already seen anti-inflationary 
successes under Volker (Jenkins & Eckert, 1989. Laffer, 2006). Tight government 
spending, particularly social spending (and excluding military spending as 
military pressure was part of Reagan’s vision of U.S international relations), was 
 
12 Supply side economics: Opposite to Keynesianism demand side economics. States that 
decreasing tax stimulates private investment, and so increases productivity and employment. 
Proponents such as Laffer go as far as to claim via the over simplistic Laffer curve, that decreased 
tax rates result in increased tax revenue because it incentivizes employment and increases the 
tax base.  What this perspective fails to account for is the difference in incentive and revenue 
collection of rate changes to different tax brackets, the relation and incentive differences 
between income tax and GST. Thus, even if there is some truth to the theory in general, it has 
little practical use as an indicator of appropriate tax rates.   
13 Economic Austerity: Proposes stringent government budgets to reduce debt, abolished 
corporate taxes to stimulate growth, as well as monitored and regularly adjusted federal tax 
rates in order to create controlled recessions to curb inflation. This methodologically individualist 
approach places no responsibility on either companies or governments for the detrimental socio-
cultural and ecological effects of the austere budgets and cuts in social spending. The effects of 
poverty for instance are seen as the individual’s responsibility, regardless of employment and 
income rates which are directly altered by austere policy shifts such as welfare cuts and strategic 
tax raises. For instance, cuts in welfare increase the supply of labour and desperation of the 
unemployed, thus decreasing the competitive wage rate. It also increases the incentives toward 
alternative income streams such as criminal income, as do increases in the cost of living or any 
other measure taken which makes it more difficult for the employed to provide for themselves 




implemented to control national debt (Jenkins & Eckert, 1989. Laffer, 2006). 
Reductions to the regulatory framework, especially to minimum wage protection, 
welfare programs, union power, and antitrust regulation completed the package 
that once delivered, would alter the course of U.S and subsequently global 
politico-economic relations for good.  
   
While Reagan is widely credited as the implementor of neoliberalism in 
the U.S, it turns out that Chicago school theory was impacting regulatory 
outcomes prior to Reagan’s election, and not just through the policy groups 
discussed above. Chairman Miller of the Board of Directors played a role in the 
inception of Chicago’s antitrust doctrine into U.S legislation through the late 70s, 
challenging established interpretations of antitrust law. The call was then picked 
up by the Reagan administration, particularly one Assistant Attorney General 
Baxter (Flynn, 1983).  
The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act were all 
founded (prior to the Chicago schools influence) on the premises of fair and 
equitable entry and inclusion into, and opportunity within, a well-maintained 
competitive order of socio-economic and political power and wealth distribution. 
But each of these was undermined by the Chicago school’s doctrine and its 
practical implementation and development prior to, during, and since the Reagan 
administration (Flynn, 1983). All three Acts have been undermined by a shift in 
perspective and interpretation, as well as over-complication and subsequent price 
rises of the legal processes and representation required by small to medium size 
businesses to build law-suits (Flynn, 1983). Thus, the Reagan administration saw 
unprecedented falls in antitrust regulatory action, even though the same official 
legislation existed.  
 
As stated, the most significant economic contradiction early on was 
between supply-side tax cuts and austere monetary policy. The loss of tax revenue 
caused by the cuts resulted in government deficits which prompted the federal 
reserve to further restrict money supply. This effectively halted the economy and 
caused the fragile coalition of conservative policy boards and groups to split into 
several fractions. The more unified austerity front won out, and in 1982 Reagan 




resembling their pre-Reagan highs (Laffer,2006)) and further spending cuts. Thus, 
austerity economics as developed in the Chicago schools of law and economics 
came to dominate the social and politico-economic policy of the U.S.A in 
compromise with supply side economics and with few residual influences of 
Keynesian economics found in the new framework.  
This basically sums up the second phase of neoliberalism, and its first 
national template, dubbed here Friedmanite neoliberalism. Observably based on 
Friedmanite and Chicago school theory, but in practicality a compromise between 




2.4: The Washington Consensus: Rise of the neoclassical 
Era 
 
In 1989 John Williamson outlined a policy framework which he believed the top 
heads in Washington14 had generally agreed upon. It basically claimed a general 
convergence of international development ideology towards, but not directly in 
line with that espoused by the OECD. Williamson claimed in 2009 that his 
original terminology has been taken out of context and become the subject of 
much debate due to (a) generalisations of his 10 points which lack the specificity 
of his original documentation, (b) oversights and “wishful thinking” on his own 
part as to how converged Washington had become, and (c) differences in his 
theoretical observations and the pursuing practical developments as if his was 
some official declaration of Washington’s unbending intentions in the developing 
world. It must be recognised for instance that the IMF pushed bi-polar exchange 
rate reform by which nations would either float their exchange rates cleanly or fix 
them firmly by an institutional device, while Williamson had proposed an 
intermediate regulation of competitive exchange rates. The IMF also pushed for 
comprehensive capital account liberalisation in direct opposition of Williamson’s 
explicit call for limiting account liberalisation to foreign direct investment. 
 
14 Washington refers in this context to “both the political Washington of Congress and senior 
members of the administration and the technocratic Washington of the international financial 
institutions, the economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the 




Williamson blames the first of these deviations for Argentina’s financial collapse 
in 2001, and the second for the 1997 Asian crises. 
 
The 10 principles of Williamson’s Washington Consensus as found 
reviewed in A Short History of the Washington Consensus (2009) are as follows. 
Note that he had prematurely, discarded monetarism, supply-side economics and 
minimal government as “impractical or undesirable fads” (P.9).   
 
“1. Fiscal Discipline. This was in the context of a region where almost all 
countries had run large deficits that led to balance of payments crises and 
high inflation that hit mainly the poor because the rich could park their 
money abroad. 
2. Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities. This suggested switching 
expenditure in a pro-growth and pro-poor way, from things like non-merit 
subsidies to basic health and education and infrastructure. It did not call 
for all the burden of achieving fiscal discipline to be placed on expenditure 
cuts; on the contrary, the intention was to be strictly neutral about the 
desirable size of the public sector, an issue on which even a hopeless 
consensus-seeker like me did not imagine that the battle had been resolved 
with the end of history that was being promulgated at the time. 
3. Tax Reform. The aim was a tax system that would combine a 
broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates. 
4. Liberalizing Interest Rates. In retrospect I wish I had formulated this 
in a broader way as financial liberalization, stressed that views differed on 
how fast it should be achieved, and-especially recognised the importance 
of accompanying financial liberalization with prudential supervision. 
5. A Competitive Exchange Rate15. I fear I indulged in wishful thinking 
in asserting that there was a consensus in favour of ensuring that the 
exchange rate would be competitive, which pretty much implies an 
 
15 “I have seen it asserted that a competitive exchange rate is the same as an 
undervalued rate. Not so; a competitive rate is a rate that is not overvalued, i.e. that is 
either undervalued or correctly valued. My fifth point reflects a conviction that 
overvalued exchange rates are worse than unvalued rates, but a rate that is neither 





intermediate regime; in fact Washington was already beginning to edge 
toward the two-corner doctrine which holds that a country must either fix 
firmly or else it must float "cleanly". 
6. Trade Liberalization. I acknowledged that there was a difference of 
view about how fast trade should be liberalized, but everyone agreed that 
was the appropriate direction in which to move. 
7. Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment. I specifically 
did not include comprehensive capital account liberalization, because I did 
not believe that did or should command a consensus in Washington. 
8. Privatization. As noted already, this was the one area in which what 
originated as a neoliberal idea had won broad acceptance. We have since 
been made very conscious that it matters a lot how privatization is done: it 
can be a highly corrupt process that transfers assets to a privileged elite for 
a fraction of their true value, but the evidence is that it brings benefits 
(especially in terms of improved service coverage) when done properly, 
and the privatized enterprise either sells into a competitive market or is 
properly regulated. 
9. Deregulation. This focused specifically on easing barriers to entry and 
exit, not on abolishing regulations designed for safety or environmental 
reasons, or to govern prices in a non-competitive industry. 
10. Property Rights. This was primarily about providing the informal 
sector with the ability to gain property rights at acceptable cost (inspired 
by Hernando de Soto's analysis).” (Williamson, 2009. P.9-10) 
 
While some, such as Robinson (2004), Carroll & Sapinski (2016), and 
Stiglitz (2003) have interpreted these points as fundamentally synonymous with 
neoliberalism, indeed, as the very definition of practical neoliberalism, it seems 
their criticism is misplaced. It will be noted that some key neoliberal prescriptions 
are missing from this list; monetarism is not promoted over fiscalism, although it 
is inherent to both neoliberal and neoclassical models. Minimalist governments 
are also not promoted. Meanwhile, public spending is promoted for healthcare and 
education which would obviously fall outside the sphere of the discussed 
neoliberal model of development, but well within that of neoclassical MMEs. 




liberalisation, and moderate taxes with wide tax bases are all shared attributes of 
neoliberal and neoclassical thought, and deregulation, as proposed by Williamson, 
excludes the forms most frequently critiqued as neoliberal. In fact, Williamson’s 
views on deregulation are more closely aligned with Samuelson’s ideas than the 
destructive Friedmanite values Williamson is accused of. Furthermore, and as 
noted, both the Asian financial crises and Argentinian collapse can at least 
partially be attributed to practical deviations from the exchange rate and FDI 
liberalisations in the Washington consensus. In fact, Williamson argued against 
both bi-polar exchange rates, and comprehensive capital account liberalisation 
specifically. 
Therefore, it must be admitted that this set of policy prescriptions falls 
more closely toward the neoclassical blueprint than the neoliberal. This is not to 
say that those scholars would be wrong to critique it, simply that it should be 
critiqued for what it is; that is one scholar’s observations of growing trends 
amongst Washington and the international institutions.  
It is utilised here as a rough framework for the neoclassical model of 
development preferred by Washington.  
 
This list is observably optimistic. Perhaps, as Williamson admitted, it was 
published a decade early. In hindsight, it was at the forefront of a perspective shift 
which took place through the late 1980s and early-mid-1990s. A shift that really 
came into its own in the mid-late-1990s when Bill Clinton and Tony Blair shifted 
policy in the U.S and U.K toward neoclassical Third-way formulations of the 
mixed market economy. Thus, ending the decade long reign of Friedmanite 
neoliberalism. This shift is largely due to Samuelson’s influence in and beyond 
the U.S, and Anthony Giddens’ (1994, 2000) influence in the U.K. This era saw 
the mentioned welfare reforms, tax alterations, and improvements to state 
education and healthcare provisions. It also saw the first U.S budget surpluses 
since 1969.  
 
This formulation lasted, largely intact, until the 2008 financial crises, after 
which we have seen a regression into protectionist nationalism, as demonstrated 
by Trump in the U.S, an intensified  reversion toward socialism in South America, 




reinforcement of socialist ideals in France demonstrated by the near rise of Le Pen 
and recent protests, and of course-Brexit.  
While the U.S and U.K made the shift to MME neoliberalism in the mid-
late-1990s, the international institutions in charge of the global monetary system 
lagged somewhat, with the IMF grasping to the Friedmanite model until after the 
1997 Asian financial crises, and even the 2001 financial collapse of Argentina, 
each of which highlighted some serious flaws. 
 
 
2.6: Section Conclusions 
 
Section two has covered perhaps the most important politico-economic 
shifts in modern history; the rise and fall of both the Bretton Woods system and 
Friedmanite neoliberalism. In doing so it identifies three stages in post WW11 
capitalism in the U.S and U.K. These are (1) the Bretton Woods era from 1944 
until it was definitively ended by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, (2) the 
era of Friedmanite neoliberalism which rose through the late 1970s, dominated the 
politico-economic landscape of the North Atlantic through the 1980s, and was 
finally reigned in during the mid-1990s when (3) neoclassicism gained dominance 
and maintained the legitimacy of free-market capitalism through class 
compromise in the MME template, and especially third-way formulations. While 
the focus of this essay is the rise and fall of both the Bretton Woods and neoliberal 
eras, it is worth noting that a fourth stage of capitalism has developed since the 
financial crash of 2008. This is the era of post crises protectionism, but a full 
examination must await further study. 
 
Practically we see that the three capitalist models of development with 
their separate national templates were each based on corresponding ideological 
blueprints. The Bretton Woods model of development was based on compromises 
between Keynes and White who represented Britain and the U.S at the Bretton 
Woods conference. Much of the national template was carried over from the New 
Deal.  
The neoliberal model was largely based on the writings of Friedman and 




other ideas such as supply-side economics. Proponents also never fully disbanded 
the welfare state or the workers Unions, although both were heavily reduced over 
the years.  
Finally, the MME model is captured in the neoclassical writings of 
Samuelson. It is itself a compromise between Keynesian and Classical models and 
shares many affinities with neoliberalism which both schools have carried through 
from classical liberals. As such it has carried through many practical aspects of 
the neoliberal template such as monetary adjustment and a degree of disregard to 
private monopoly (more onus was placed on negating its negative effects though); 
while at the same time strengthening and reinstituting Keynesian tools, such as 
fiscal adjustments, redistributive taxes, and wage controls, and also reinvigorating 
the welfare state. It will be noted that the MME is a much more flexible template 
than the neoliberal model which came before it.  
Working with this, we see that each of the intellectuals reviewed in section 
one proposed his own ideological blueprint. However, section two has 
demonstrated how these ideological blueprints are practically implemented in 
compromise with existing socio-economic and political viewpoints, opposing 
intellectuals, and exogenous pressures. It showed the employment of key scholars 
and advocates to key positions and delved ever so slightly into the class and class-
fractional conflict and compromise involved in political shifts, especially those of 
such a magnitude as explored here.  
It has thus, delivered on our first major theme, finding that practical 
models are unlikely to reflect the purity of ideological blueprints. The brief 
exploration of developments in the U.K under Thatcher shows that even closely 
linked and similarly governed nations will experience similar ideological 
developments in practically diverse ways based on unique historical evolutions in 







Section 3: Neoliberal Institutions. 
 
Recall that WW11, and particularly the 1944 Bretton Woods conferences 
marked a profound shift in the international institutional layout. The Bretton 
Woods agreement was reached through negotiations between the allied nations, 
particularly Britain and the U. S, and specifically, their economic representatives 
being John Maynard Keynes and Harry White respectively. However, the 
economic strength of the U.S compared with the devastated European countries 
and the political and ideological segregation of the Soviet Union, as well as the 
dependence of allied states, particularly Britain, on U.S generosity; insured a bias 
of bargaining power which allowed the U.S to twist the agreement in its favour 
(Boughton, 2004). From the weighted debates of these new deal economists, 
stemmed a global project which linked all participants currency to the American 
Dollar which was then linked to gold. This perversion of the gold standard16 was 
widely adopted, as were the other aspects of the Bretton Woods model of 
development and its national template. Demand-side economics saw the continued 
growth of workers unions to protect wages and worker’s rights to stimulate 
employment and demand for manufactured products. Manufacture and industry 
were largely nationalised with the import and export of raw materials and 
completed goods being the norm over the outsourcing of labour and manufacture 
of components associated with the international production networks of today. To 
oversee and facilitate the implementation of this agreement, and as a compromise 
of Keynes to the geopolitical arguments of White, two institutions were created. 
White’s International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created as a lender of last resort 
who would lend to nations to avert immediate balance of payments deficits 
(Reinhart & Trebesch, 2016), while the World Bank, originally the World Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was set up to lend money to nations 
for ‘brick-and-mortar’ reconstruction projects and further development of the 
allied nations.  
But these were not the only international organisations established in the 
post WW11 fora. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was a 
 
16 A true gold standard relies on each nation linking their own currency to gold without the 
median of the particular currency which has the power to set value, or as it happened, crash the 




multilateral legal framework aimed at increasing international trade by eliminating 
impediments such as tariffs and integrating European markets under the Marshal 
plan for their and the U.S’s mutual gain. It was founded largely on the basis of 
U.S hegemony to increase the sphere of economic integration and political 
alliance to combat the post-war spread of communism (Davis & Wilf, 2017). 
Although this legal agreement was not in itself an institution, it laid the foundation 
for the World Trade Organisation which was formed in 1995, and still makes up a 
significant portion of its legal framework in 2018.  
Also established at this pivotal moment in history was the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which has since grown into the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OEEC 
was originally established in 1947 to administer the Marshal plan by addressing 
balance of payments issues while liberalising participant nations’ policy 
frameworks and lowering quotas (Clark & Thompson, 2011). 
 
One thing each of these institutions and their associated legal frameworks 
have in common is their gradual, and sometimes quite sudden evolution in 
ideological position, and subsequent reorientation of roles, mandates, and 
internationally binding legal frameworks. From Bretton Woods roots for the IMF 
and WB and Marshal plan aid for the OEEC/OECD, and the GATT/WTO, toward 
Friedmanite neoliberal values through the late 1970s and 1980s, to more refined 
and less extreme neoclassical tenets through the late 1990s.  
As will be seen, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods era which led to the 
uptake of neoliberalism had a profound effect on these institutions. Because of the 
OECD and G7 countries’ dominance of voting procedures (particularly the U.S), 
the spread of neoliberalism amongst them led to its spread within the named 
institutions, and subsequently into the nations under their sphere of influence, 
often forcefully. As such the neoliberal era is characterised by the North Atlantic’s 
geopolitical and economic dominance of the south. Because the OECD and G7 
nations utilised their powers for their own benefit, especially the U.S, the 
institutions represented their interests in the developing world in an increasingly 
coordinated manner and used their leverage to reach favourable conclusions. This 
was done through a national template that was both incentivised and forcibly 




indoctrinated into the neoliberal template, they entered into the global marketplace 
via WTO membership, after which they were held to internationally binding law 
which favours the OECD and G7 nations. 
The uptake of neoclassicism and the MME template stemmed from 
widespread disillusionment with neoliberalism’s failure to provide adequate 
economic stability, equilibrium, social welfare, or ecological sustainability. The 
re-realisation that unguided markets led by unrestrained multinational 
corporations were not, in reality, the perfect mechanism of unfettered social good 
that the theoretical works had made it seem; the understanding that trickle-down 
economics was a farce for instance, or that stability and growth required a number 
of intricate and constant interventions, and that without supervision corporations 
would run rampant and soon overheat both the economy and the planet to the 
demise of every living organism; brought about a consciousness of the necessity 
for change. Thus, the era of Friedmanite neoliberalism which emerged through the 
1970s to take hold in the early-1980s, was capped in the mid-late-1990s and has 
been continuously phased out since. This is not to say that the West or these 
global institutions have lost faith in capitalism or even free-markets by any means. 
Simply that the global order has shifted to a more flexible version that seeks to 
use market mechanisms, private property, and ever-more Keynesian regulation to 
address the identified short comings of Friedmanite neoliberalism. 
The following four sub-sections explore these developments institution by 
institution to divulge the details and determinants of these shifts on the evolution 
of the transnational model of development, and the national template included 
within and spread to the world. Thus, satisfying the second major theme of this 
thesis.        
 
 
3.1: The International Monetary Fund 
 
The IMF was created at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference but became 
operational in 1947. The U.S’s previously mentioned dominance at the 
negotiating table gained it the U.S dollar-based exchange rates which turned other 
currencies into fiat currencies, as well as the locating of the IMF headquarters in 




bias of voting rights and majority control of lending decisions (Boughton, 2004).
 Early IMF loans were short term, usually one-year standard arrangements 
to cover balance of payments deficits. However, due to reoccurring BOP deficits 
these were increasingly stretched to two-year arrangements and renewed as 
necessary (Reinhart & Trebecsh, 2016). Most early loans went to advanced 
nations, as the Bretton Woods institutions’ original memberships were the allied 
nations, of which advanced nations were both the worst affected, the most 
important to the international economic system, and held the greatest influence in 
voting procedures. Such early loans came with limited conditionality. This was 
the norm for the first two decades of IMF operation, but as U.S economic 
hegemony came under fire, the layout of international economic geopolitics 
shifted with it, requiring the IMF (and other institutions) to adapt (Boughton, 
2004).  
The combination of U.S spending through the Marshal plan, as well as its 
financial involvement in Indochina, particularly in the Korea and Vietnam, 
undermined its economic growth. Simultaneously, Japan (released from the 
conflict in 1945) and Germany were utilising protectionist policy to stimulate 
rapid growth and investing heavily in key companies and sectors including 
automotive manufacture. This directly challenged the more liberal U.S industries 
and undermined the intentions of the Bretton Woods agreement to sustain a stable 
international economy. This aligns, at least in Germany, with the nationalisation 
of investment proposed by Hayek, and the Ordo-liberalism which diverged from 
his writings led by Ropke and Euken.  
 As a result of heavy competition from these systems and the rising Asian 
tigers, the U.S held percentage of world exports fell from twenty-two to twelve 
between 1948 and 1978, while its percentage of international reserves fell from 
fifty-four to twelve (Boughton, 2004; P.8). This trajectory was obvious as early as 
1969 when the IMF introduced Special Drawing Rights as a response to a 
shortage of Gold and U.S Dollars. As U.S economic and financial power was 
diluted and “more currencies became fully convertible for current account and 
even capital transactions” (Boughton, 2004; P.8). It became increasingly obvious 
that the system of fiat currencies was unsustainable. In 1971, inspired by 
economist Paul Volker, President Nixon floated the U.S dollar from the gold 




Bretton Woods system of international exchange (Goldman, 2005; Zeiler, 2013). 
This pitted currencies against each other with valuation based on supply and 
demand which saw the U.S dollar drop 13.5 percent against the German mark, and 
over 16 percent against the yen. Combined with a 10 percent surcharge on 
imports, this fed an unprecedented surge of speculative investment into the U.S as 
investors fled European exporters, collapsing their stock markets. $400 million 
were sold overseas and as more and more currencies were floated from the dollar, 
international exchanges were flooded with volatile money, adding options to the 
speculative banquet (Zeiler, 2013).  
The IMF experienced a phenomenal influx of members from low-and 
middle-income countries through the early-1970s (Reinhart & Trebesch, 2016). 
But the 1970s also saw the rise of Saudi Arabia and other middle eastern oil 
producers. The first oil shock in 1973 rocked the global economy. It fuelled the 
recycling of petrodollars as financial intermediaries reinvested middle-eastern 
deposits into low and middle-income oil consuming neighbours. In collaboration 
with the Eurodollar and other financial markets which were still experiencing a 
speculative boom, these phenomena contributed to an “aggressive expansion” of 
lending to a myriad of developing nations by financial intermediaries (Reinhart & 
Trebesch, 2016; Boughton, 2004). It seemed too good to last, and it was.  
In 1979 Paul Volker, who since 1971 had risen to president of the federal 
reserve, introduced austere monetarism and increased both the federal and prime 
interest rates, causing the U.S. dollar to spike and forcing these developing 
nations to pay significantly increased interest on loans (Reinhart & Trebesch, 
2016). This caused widespread economic turmoil amongst indebted low and 
middle income, developing and emerging economies whose loans were mostly 
taken as short-term agreements with variable interest rates and were often dollar 
denominated. The real cost of debt service rose exponentially, but the markets 
were not through with them. The early 1980s saw commodity and oil prices 
collapse, and much of the global south was thrown into financial ruin (Reinhart & 
Trebesch, 2016). Seeing nations in Latin America, Africa, Southern Asia and the 
European periphery as unsound investments, private banks stopped lending. Their 
abandonment plunged global markets into darkness and left affected countries 




in a debt crisis which has been described as a lost decade (Reinhart & Trebesch, 
2016).  
The IMF had, since it was discussed by Keynes and White, considered 
private sector financial flows to be of “limited scope and importance” and with 
shared scepticism of cross-border portfolio flows had decided in Article vi that 
“the IMF should be given the power to restrict capital flows [via controls] in 
situations where they seemed to be destabilizing […] and did not restrict 
payments for transactions on the current account.” (Boughton, 2004; P.11).  
 
In the mid-1970s The IMF began hiring Chicago based scholars (Wolff, 
2013). This marks the beginning of an ideological shift for the IMF, and between 
1976 and 1983 IMF lending programs doubled. By the 1980s IMF staff claimed 
that markets had grown to the extent that it was considered beneficial to attract 
continuous capital inflows rather than attempt to cover BOP deficits with one-off 
loans. At this point policy reforms targeted at attracting foreign investment began 
to take precedent in negotiations, with the initial loan seen as a short-term 
substitute. This marked the consolidation of Friedmanite neoliberal ideology, and 
the beginning of its transnational implementation through the national template 
dictated by its lending conditions which were incorporated into structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs), and Enhanced (otherwise referred to as Economic) 
Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAPs). These programs gave low-interest 
loans to low-income countries in return for in-depth reforms of macro and 
microeconomic policies, predominantly industrial, fiscal and monetary policies. 
With this, the lender of last resort had adopted the role of crisis management and 
using the tools at its disposal (Western ‘best practices’ which were, as noted, 
almost synonymous with Friedmanite neoliberalism) it went to work re-
establishing Southern economies. It continued to develop in this capacity long 
after the Washington Consensus was published.  
In 1997 Asia fell into a crisis that quickly spread into Latin America, 
Russia and Eastern Europe. By the 1990s international financial flows were 
considered crucial to financing any emerging or industrial nation (Boughton, 





The IMF’s handling of the crises shows that this institution at least, was 
not in consensus with the domestic policy of Washington.  
At the time, several Southeast Asian currencies were attached to the dollar. 
They had been coerced into comprehensive capital account liberalisation, opening 
their markets to international capital. The influx of investment lifted national 
companies, economies and currencies to unprecedented heights. Then things in 
Asia took a turn for the worse when Thailand began to falter around 1995. The 
default of an industrial property developer in early 1997 marked the bursting of an 
industrial property bubble, and with the 1995 collapse of the Mexican Peso on 
their minds, investors began pulling their money from Thailand (Boughton, 2012).  
Speculative arbitrage on their currency worsened the contraction, while Thailand 
refused to devalue, or preferable to the IMF, float the Baht. Instead, it attempted 
to hold up the economy by forward selling the Baht, draining its reserves, and 
closing down or taking over finance companies to stop them defaulting. Finally, 
on July 2, the Thai government gave in to IMF advice to float their exchange rate. 
The Baht fell “17 percent against the U.S dollar in offshore trading, and the Asian 
financial crisis [began] in earnest” (Boughton, 2012. P.506).    
The close proximity of Southeast Asian countries along with the basket of 
linked exchange rates spread the hardships, and soon, limited reserves and large 
account deficits became the norm, causing a broad overvaluation of Southeast 
Asian currencies (Burton & Nesiba. Ch.7 in O’Hara, 2004). The IMF stepped in 
with short-term loans on the conditions that nations 1) “raise interest rates in an 
attempt to halt the slide in currency values and 2) [] pursue contractionary fiscal 
policies designed to cut consumption. The fall in consumption would, 
theoretically, lead to a decrease in imports and a reduction in the current account 
deficit” (Burton & Nesiba. Ch.7 in O’Hara, 2004. P.162). These served only to 
intensify the present contractionary trajectory. And by 1998 the whole of 
Southeast Asia was in a state of economic crises. 
Clearly, the IMF’s bi-polar exchange rate model played a part in 
Thailand’s and thus Asia’s financial crises. But more influential, as pointed out by 
Williamson, was the comprehensive opening of capital accounts which allowed 
for speculative arbitrage such as currency attacks, volatile investments and capital 
flight. On top of this, the IMF coerced Asian countries into contractionary fiscal 





It wasn’t until 2000 that the IMF began to see the error of its ways. It 
launched a comprehensive review and restructuring of its policies. Restructures 
focussed on six areas:   
“Strengthening surveillance and crisis prevention; Helping member countries 
strengthen their institutional capacity; Improving IMF lending; Enhancing the 
framework for crisis resolution; Strengthening support for low income countries; 
and Ensuring that the IMF is an open and learning institution” 
(www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2002/120502.htm).  
 Included in these are several key concessions. The IMF decided it would 
be more considerate and attentive to national needs and goals when applying 
conditions for their loans. Even claiming that “In helping members to devise 
economic and financial programs, the Fund will pay due regard to the domestic 
social and political objectives, the economic priorities, and the circumstances of 
members, including the causes of their balance of payments problems and their 
administrative capacity to implement reforms” (IMF, 2002a. P.1-2). Furthermore, 
they claim in an ethical breakthrough, that “the Fund will be guided by the 
principle that the member has primary responsibility for the selection, design, and 
implementation of its economic and financial policies” (IMF, 2002a. P.1).  
 The lead-agency arrangement is heralded as the end of overlapping and 
incoherent discrepancies between the IMF and WB in areas of mutual interest. As 
stated by the IMF, “The application of a “lead agency” framework, such as 
between the Fund and the Bank, will be implemented flexibly to take account of 
the circumstances of members and the overlapping interests of the two institutions 
with respect to some aspects of members’ policies. The Fund’s policy advice, 
program design, and conditionality will, insofar as possible, be consistent and 
integrated with those of other international institutions within a coherent country-
led framework” (IMF, 2002a. P.3). This is a clear shift from previous 
circumstances when the two institutions would solicit as many SAPs as they could 
onto members in need. It also backs up a key theme of this thesis, that these four 
institutions work together through their unique roles to maintain and reconstruct 




 While these concessions offer an illusion of good intentions, no 
amendments were made to their Articles of Agreement at this time. The reforms 
are simply a statement that the IMF would be more equal, fair and transparent 
with the application of its agenda. It does, however, offer increased grounds for 
States to set their own priorities, including welfare and social spending. It also 
offers a new platform geared towards poverty reduction and includes the 
admission that market exposure might, in some cases, be gradually increased, and 
in some cases might need more stringent regulation by states to retain stability. 
 This new way to interpret and administer the articles facilitates the 
spreading MME national template. And signals the IMF’s recognition, and 
acceptance of the new neoclassical era in international economic and socio-
political policy regimes.  
   
In this subsection, we have seen the development of the IMF from an 
extension of U.S post-WW11 geopolitical relations. We see how a collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, led to the rise of Friedmanite neoliberal values. This, 
along with the pursuit of a neoliberal global economy by the OECD and G7, 
resulted in a shift in IMF mandate and the introduction of SAPs used to more 
effectively enforce its policy prescriptions. The IMF held onto Friedmanite values 
for years after even the U.S had made class-compromises to off-set its negative 
social outcomes. Finally, from 2000 to 2002, after the Asian financial crises, and 
coinciding with the financial collapse of Argentina, both of which were caused in 
part by IMF interference; the IMF reviewed and reformed the process by which it 
applies the mandate and policies in its Articles of Agreement. This signals the end 
of the IMF’s neoliberal era, and the beginning of its neoclassical era through the 
introduction of a more nuanced approach to international integration.  
 
 
3.2: The World Bank 
 
At the Bretton Woods conference, debate flared over the proposed 




insisted that the bank be created, it was if nothing else, a nod to his clearing 
Union. He found little argument from White on the topic. White, also a keen 
proponent of the new deal era, made a convincing argument; that “there’s nothing 
that will serve to drive [developing and war torn] countries into some kind of-ism-
communism or something else-faster than having inadequate capital” (Goldman, 
2005; P.55). Backed by the U.S and supported by other allies, the IBRD was 
created to loan capital to rebuild and further develop war-torn allies.  
After a period of inactivity under the first president, the second, a veteran 
of wall street named John McCloy finally authorised the first loan. France was 
chosen over Poland and Chile, and the $500m dollars requested was reduced to 
$250m and offered with strict conditions. Firstly, France had to pledge that IBRD 
interest payments would be prioritised over all other foreign debt payments; and 
secondly, France had to accept that “the Bank would closely supervise the French 
economy to ensure that the government took steps to balance its budget, increase 
taxes, and cut consumption of certain luxury imports”; and thirdly, that $250m 
worth of bonds would have to be successfully floated on the New York market 
prior to approval (Goldman, 2005. P.56; Bird, 1992).  
“Simultaneously, the [U.S.] State Department bluntly informed the French 
that they would have to “correct the current situation” by removing any 
communist representatives from cabinet” (Goldman, 2005. P.56; Bird, 1992).  
This was done in May 1947, showing that in the very first loan, conditions 
entailed both ideological policy reforms and U.S geopolitical motives which 
challenged state sovereignty and even the scope and effectiveness of democracy. 
Within hours of the communist ousting, McCloy announced the loan application 
successful (Goldman, 2005; Bird, 1992). 
 
The Bank continued its highly selective and conservative lending policy, 
favouring relatively safe loans in the West until the Marshal Plan was launched.  
While the plan was launched by President Truman, it was driven and 
named after U.S secretary of state, General George Marshal, but was the 
brainchild of U.S undersecretary of state for economic affairs, Will Clayton.  
Clayton had seen first hand the struggles of broke and broken European 
nations. He took it upon himself to solve the rampant social issues such as poverty 




lack of functioning industry, market strength, and economic resources. With the 
backing of Marshal and Truman, he spent several months working with European 
governments as they drafted and submitted a unified plan for reconstruction, along 
with a request for aid funds to complete it. This aid of course, came with trade 
liberalising conditions as per Clayton’s free trade and sound monetary economic 
perspectives17 for the good of Europe, and U.S trade and geopolitical interests in 
the area, i.e. increasing lucrative free trade and stopping the spread of 
communism. Even the Brits, still under a grandeur illusion of imperial greatness 
in 1947, succumbed to “a reduction in […] preference margins, while cutting their 
reciprocal demands for U.S tariff reductions” (Steil, 2013). 
  
The Plan, guided by the specially established General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and administered by the OEEC, pumped Europe full 
of U.S dollars in an attempt to liberalise and rejuvenate markets and quell the 
spread of communism from the East.  
The Marshal Plan had a dire impact on the IBRD which saw demand for 
its services plummet. This left the institution with no direction or real purpose to 
serve. If the IBRD was to survive, it needed a new mandate, a new purpose. The 
decision was made to spread its services beyond Europe, outside the Marshal 
plan’s scope. The obvious places to start were the remaining colonies and the 
newly independent ex-colonies.  
 
The lack of available knowledge and understanding of developing nations 
and the near absence of academic literature on the topic, coupled with a long and 
widely accepted history of colonial violence and exploitation founded on an 
undying Western arrogance; put the IBRD on the frontline of barbaric 
development discourse and action. But progress was slow. Due to their wall street 
financing the IBRD’s focus was initially confined to tangible, trade inducing 
infrastructure projects. The big five voting powers of its membership (U.S, U.K, 
Germany, Japan, and France) commanded much of the early architecture of the 
Bank and insured their firms were well represented. Thus, early international 
 
17 Clayton took at least some influence from Hayek as well as Keynes. The Marshal plan achieved 
much of what Keynes had envisioned with his clearing fund, albeit without the bancor or global 
economic stability; while the GATT Clayton established, and his idea of a European federation 




lending debate revolved around whose “currency would be used and whose 
financial intermediaries and capital goods would be purchased” (Goldman, 2005. 
P.58). On top of these concerns, pressure from the U.S State Department confined 
them to its geopolitical allies (Kapur, Webb & Lewis, 1997). 
It is interesting to note that while Guatemala and Ceylon among others 
were off limits due to the “political position of the parties in power” (Goldman, 
2005. P.58), The U.S had no problem allowing, and even supplementing loans 
with additional Military and foreign aid funds, to several “brutal authoritarian 
regimes in Latin America” (Goldman, 2005. P.58; Payer, 1982). This fits well 
with more radical discourse (See Klein, 2007) which claims that democracy plays 
less part in U.S foreign policy than the opening of borders to foreign investment. 
It also lends itself to claims that authoritarian regimes have been used to 
implement economic reform in areas where the people and therefore democratic 
processes have been unaccommodating, especially when reform was desired to 
stop communist or socialist developments.  
Regardless, these conflicts of interest in IBRD activities effectively 
hamstrung the institution between its initial shift toward colonial development and 
the decline of the Bretton Woods system through the 1970s. This said, the IBRD 
had taken baby steps toward its current role as a multilateral policy powerhouse.  
The wars in Indo-China had a few effects on the World Bank (WB). 
Firstly, they undermined U.S economic dominance, contributing largely to the 
falling of the U.S’s share of world GDP from 35 percent in the 1950s to 26 
percent in the 1970s (Gwin, 1997); secondly, it caused political and economic 
havoc in affected areas; and finally, amid popular disapproval of U.S participation 
in the war which was going shamefully wrong, President Johnson decided to fire 
his Secretary of Defence, or more accurately, reassign him to chairman of the 
World Bank (Goldman, 2005).  
In his first few weeks, “Former Harvard Business School professor, Ford 
Motor Company CEO, Ford Foundation board member, and Secretary of 
Defence” (Goldman, 2005. P.62), Robert McNamara, wasted no time in 
developing two goals for the WB. The first was to establish “new sources of 
finance”, and the second was to establish “new mechanisms to protect the Bank 
against funding risks by develop[ing] a plan for standby credit with commercial 




With his rather impressive resume, it seems hard to believe that 
McNamara had no association with the ‘old boys club’ of crony capitalists and 
national elites. Although it is claimed that the intentions of his development 
policies were good, given his history and the outcomes of his policies, it seems 
unlikely. He may well have been the most genuine chairman so far in his efforts to 
curb poverty, but overall his time is mired, as are so many others, by the 
prioritising of geopolitical concerns and corporate favouritism over the people his 
position exists to help. None the less, McNamara managed what might at the time 
have seemed impossible; to fund, create, and utilise knowledge production and 
dissemination networks and the subsequent influx of development and 
modernisation literature, to legitimise a massive geographical and in-depth 
increase in WB funding, projects and influence.  
The Volker inspired collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and the huge 
rise in speculative investment tasted like opportunity on the tip of McNamara’s 
tongue. Amidst the vast variety of brazen rocks awaiting the tumultuous waves of 
abundant wealth, McNamara’s WB was advertising risk guaranteed investments 
in highly liquid global bonds. An investment which aided the construction of 
productive infrastructure and ensured favourable policy shifts in exciting and 
potentially lucrative locations; thus, creating further investment opportunities. It 
was a sandy beach on which to await the calming of volatile financial seas. On top 
of issuing bonds, the WB increased its lending base and “by the 1980s was 
borrowing from countries as diverse as Kuwait, Japan, Libya, and India. It was 
working with large pension funds and multiple brokerage firms, not just the U.S. 
undersecretaries of treasury” (Goldman, 2005. P.61). The bank also began 
borrowing in multiple currencies outside those of its big five members. The shift 
in funding structure allowed McNamara’s WB to curtail to an extent, the control 
of its big five members, and even bypass the geopolitical interests and subsequent 
limitations of the U.S State Department.  
With such a successful mechanism of capital building in place, the 
problem soon became who to lend all its capital to in an international climate 
where demand for WB services had diminished greatly across the colonial and ex-
colonial world, partly due to dissatisfaction, and partly due to a lack of ongoing 
necessity. It was at this point that McNamara declared his vision of extending WB 




educational development, slum rebuilding, and rural healthcare (Goldman, 2005). 
Agricultural underdevelopment, in particular, was said to be a leading cause of 
poverty, malnutrition and economic underperformance. 
But this new direction required data, something McNamara viewed as 
missing from development discourse. He sent his WB envoys to all corners of the 
globe on reconnaissance missions to divulge the who, what, where and how of 
global poverty and underdevelopment, but the information in some areas came too 
slow. To speed up the information collecting process, “as well as expedite and 
legitimise new loans, McNamara [further developed] his own knowledge 
generating machinery, by adopting two Rockefeller Foundation-funded research 
centres in Mexico and the Philippines, from which he created the multi-sited 
research network called the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGAIR)” in 1971 (Goldman, 2005. P.85). By 1983 (two years after 
McNamara’s departure from the WB) “50 percent [of the total area planted in 
wheat in developing countries] was planted in CGAIR promoted [innovative 
semi-dwarf varieties]” including “80 percent of the total area for wheat in Latin 
America” (Baum, 1986. P.86). Rice fields saw the same phenomenon with “58 
percent of total area for rice in developing countries […] planted with [innovative] 
semi-dwarf varieties” including 95 percent in China, 58 in India, and 40 across the 
rest of Asia (Goldman, 2005. P.86; Baum, 1986).  
In its first 25 years “the Bank’s CGAIR trained approximately 50,000 
scientists, many of whom took up prominent positions as ministers of state, 
agriculture and finance, as well as CEOs and research directors for major 
multinational firms (Goldman, 2005. P.86). This “science-industry-government 
network” (Goldman, 2005. P.86) facilitated by the WB, created a clear and 
growing orthodoxy of reward and belief which quickly legitimised the 
liberalisation of agriculture in the developing South. As its lucrative nature was 
revealed to investors, particularly in supporting industries such as “energy, 
fertiliser, chemical pesticides, synthetic seed [and] farm machinery” (Goldman, 
2005. P.86); they began to put more stock in McNamara’s investments in 
education. This bought new funding for the creation of “agricultural universities 
and research and policy centres throughout the South” (Goldman, 2005. P.86) to 
further direct agricultural development. “These prominent national institutes 




institutions (e.g. the universities of Illinois and Iowa) and economic and law 
departments (e.g. University of Chicago), helping to “Americanize” agro-food 
systems, property-right traditions and statutes, and trade and investment laws in 
the Banks borrowing countries” (Goldman, 2005. P.87; Dezalay & Garth, 2002). 
With so many development loans being thrown at the south, its levels of 
debt became otherworldly, growing on average twenty percent per year between 
1976 and 1980 (Goldman, 2005. P,88). “By the 1980s much of what the World 
Bank was lending did not go to [productive projects]; most of it went to pay the 
interest on national budget deficits” (Goldman, 2005. P.88; McMichael, 2004).  
These payments, along with the purchase of goods and agricultural inputs 
their new agricultural systems relied on, formed the majority of crippling 
northbound capital flows. On top of this, global over-supply meant their produce 
was worth little in comparison to their costs and resulted in huge deficits and debt 
crises. These debt crises were of course framed as the fault of southern countries 
whose inefficient economic policies hindered their ability to pay back their 
generously given loans. This framing set the foundation for one of McNamara’s 
final additions to the WB; the Structural Adjustment Programs through which 
indebted countries on the brink of total implosion are forced by absolute financial 
necessity to restructure industrial, monetary, fiscal, trade, and even social and 
civil policy frameworks for an insufficient loan which adds to their total 
indebtedness.   
 
In 1981 Reagan replaced McNamara with Alden Clausen, the ex-president 
of the Bank of America. Aside from continuing to deepen the SAP regime, 
Clausen saw fit to fire the chief economist and hire in his place the dedicated 
Friedmanite, Anne Krueger. By the end of the Clausen-Krueger reign, most of the 
previous staff had also been fired and replaced with orthodox (Friedmanite) 
economists (Dezalay & Garth, 2002). During this time SAPs became the primary 
mandate for the seemingly coordinated WB and IMF, and “by the late 1980s 
UNICEF reported that World Bank adjustment programs were responsible for the 
“reduced health, nutritional, and educational levels for tens of millions of children 
in Asia, Latin America, and Africa” resulting in a “lost decade” for many of the 
Banks borrowers” (Goldman, 2005. P.90). The debt crisis, which ought to have 




The WB under the Clausen-Krueger partnership emerged as the key 
mediator of North-South debt relations, albeit on shaky ground.  The Bank faced 
heavy criticism for “reduced public spending; mass unemployment; currency 
collapse; rising prices for food, fuel, and other goods; and falling wages and 
export prices” (Goldman, 2005. P.94) across the lending board; along with 
increasing mass protests and organisation amongst those who opposed it. It faced 
further criticism for its support of some particularly heartless and/or short-sighted 
projects such as the “dozens of destructive dam, mining, and forestry projects” in 
Thailand; of forced resettlement; “the Narmada dam project in India [;] and the 
Poponoroeste highway project in Brazil” (Goldman, 2005. P.95) which facilitated 
the ground clearing of huge swaths of the Amazon and the subsequent harassment 
and displacement of local villages and peasants.  
Finally, after forty years of operation and with at least fifteen of blatantly 
destructive policy legitimised by a manufactured, directed, and downright 
manipulative development discourse; northern media hosted the long-deserved 
stoning of the willingly destructive or short-sighted institution. It should have 
signalled the WB’s last breath, instead the institution designed a new paradigm of 
manipulative “theories, idioms, images, slogans, departments, priorities, and data” 
(Goldman, 2005. P.96). As such, the bank, fronted by Barber Conable from 1986-
1991, and then Lewis Preston until 1995, reported its new learning: “that there 
could be no sustained economic growth without a sustainable environment and 
just treatment of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples living on fragile 
ecosystems” (Goldman, 2005. P.96-97).  
In 1985 the WB had 15 staff dedicated to environmental issues and lent 
less than $15m for them. In 1995 the new Environment Department employed 
over 300 dedicated staff and lent almost $1b, a growth of over 90 percent per year 
(Goldman, 2005. P.97).  This Green neoliberalism, with its emphasis on 
environmental issues came to dominate WB protocol to the extent that borrowing 
nations had to conform to the new National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) 
before any new loans could be approved. NEAP complements the WB’s SAPs by 
forcing nations into “creating cookie-cutter-like environmental protection 
agencies; redrafting forestry, land, and water laws [with an eye for privatisation]; 




cadre of professionals to carry out environmental reforms” (Goldman, 2005. 
P.97).  
In order to survive, the WB dropped some aspects of Friedmanite 
neoliberalism from its SAP mandate, but it did not drop the interests of its major 
voting powers, or those of their corporations. It simply articulated them into a 
discourse which focussed on diverting negative attention and legitimising its 
continued operations in these interests through a gradual shift towards the MME 
template. 
The changes continued into the mid to late 1990s as Wolfensohn, 
appointed president in 1996, espoused, and altered the institution toward a new 
fair and flexible procedure which worked alongside NGOs, governments, and 
even religious institutions in order to empower local communities and become 
more accountable for the social effects of its dealings.   
Combined, these transformations represent a conscious shift from purely 
Friedmanite ideals to a more nuanced neoclassical approach, accepting that free-
markets, left to their devices, do not naturally result in social good. That a more 
nuanced approach that actively accounts for and mediates between differing 
interests in differing areas, is necessary in order to achieve socially acceptable 
results, and thus maintain legitimacy as an institution. A real concern for the WB 
in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
 
To summarise, the WB struggled during the Bretton Woods era, only 
finding traction under McNamara. In a rapidly changing global geopolitical and 
economic environment, McNamara grew the WB into a noteworthy institution 
and set the intellectual and procedural foundations for its neoliberal shift, 
including the establishment of SAPs. Friedmanite neoliberalism was then 
implemented in truth by the Clausen/Krueger partnership and upheld relentlessly 
under multiple presidents, in cooperation with other institutions, and at the behest 
of the U.S and G7, until global criticism threatened the legitimacy and even the 
existence of the institution. Under these circumstances, the bank was forced to 
recreate itself in a more nuanced and socially acceptable format which facilitated 
the MME national template in recognition that its neoliberal policy prescriptions 






3.3: The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the  
World Trade Organisation 
 
 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) began its legacy in 
1948 as an offshoot of the marshal plan. Twenty-three countries signed the two-
year debated agreement with a mind to lower tariffs and liberalise international 
trade. At the time, the UN was in the midst of formulating a much more 
comprehensive and restrictive proposal, with fifty countries involved in the 
debates to form an international trade organisation to supplement the Bretton 
Woods institutions (the GATT Years… WTO.ORG). It was an ambitious project, 
and in the end, it fell flat when the U.S among others decided they would not 
commit to it and refused to ratify the agreement (the GATT Years… WTO.ORG).  
This left the GATT in a fortunate standing, as the only international trade treaty. 
Over the years it served as the platform for several rounds of international trade 
and tariff negotiations, with increased liberalisation reached at each. The first four 
rounds focussed on tariff reductions. The fifth, the Dillon round, included 
discussions on the ECC/EFTA conflict (Wolfe, 2007). The following Kennedy 
round from 1964-67 focussed on Tariff reductions and Anti-dumping measures. 
The seventh, the Tokyo round from 1973-79 introduced non-tariff trade 
liberalisation issues.  
One-hundred and twenty-three countries participated in the final round of 
trade negotiations under the original GATT. This Uruguay round, which ran from 
1986 to 1994, introduced several new aspects. It included “Tariff [ reductions], 
non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, [and the] creation of WTO” (the GATT Years… WTO.ORG) 
as a more formal forum for trade negotiations.  
The WTO “provides the common institutional [and legal] framework for 
the conduct of trade relations among its members” (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2009. 
P.58-59). These include the ever-evolving GATT, as well as the General 
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), both of which were included in the Uruguay 




Kostecki, 2009). The WTO also has a mandate for arbitration procedures in the 
instance of agreement breaches (WTO.ORG). 
  
The GATT was founded on the basis of U.S hegemony and “cold war 
policy to support economic integration and alliances as twin pillars” (Davis and 
Wilfe, 2017). 
Traces of this logic remain in the fact that nations who adhere to the 
WTO’s neoliberal policy prescriptions will not be able to revert or convert to 
communist organisation due to severe trade loss and because the liberal policies 
generally required for entry (and often imposed through interaction with the WB 
and IMF) are incompatible with central planning and difficult to reverse. The 
WTO has, since the cold war, acted as a geopolitical club of nations which 
ensures trade and thus economic benefits to its members, facilitating free trade 
and trade negotiations, including the fair arbitration of disagreements.  
The timing of the Uruguay round, between 1986 and 1994 is rather 
interesting to this thesis as negotiations began in the neoliberal era and ran 
through the period in which academic and national views were shifting. 
Unfortunately, the WTO took on many Friedmanite ideals such as its harsh 
monopoly inducing take on intellectual property rights, and its unsympathetic 
view towards developing countries who sought to protect traditional agricultural 
and manufacture processes and the livelihood of individuals within them. The 
prescriptions in the Uruguay round also favour the key players; the OECD and G7 
nations, and their large firms. This throwback to the GATT’s geopolitical motives 
is unsurprising, however, it seems as though this might be one of the final 
negotiations in which the G7 are able to bully developing nations into submission.  
The Doha round, the first under WTO guise, collapsed over negotiations 
between the U.S and the E.U, but there was also heated conflict between the north 
and south. India stood strong against pressure to further reduce tariffs on its 
agriculture and manufacture sectors, claiming that over half its population is 
engaged in agriculture, either for subsistence or profit, and that reducing tariffs 
would displace large swaths of them. They further argued that these individuals 
would be forced to seek employment in low skilled manufacturing jobs but 
wouldn’t find employment because reduced tariffs on goods, as pressed in the 




from the likes of China. This they argued would not only prevent displaced 
farmers from procuring new employment but would further add to unemployment 
as local manufacturers were forced to downsize their operations. They were 
backed in their steadfast resolution by “a group of 42 developing countries known 
as the G33, which includes heavyweights such as Indonesia” (Polaski, 2006. P.2).   
 
There is a growing concern among scholars, that preferential bi-lateral and 
multilateral trade agreements (PTAs) threaten the WTO’s value. Allee et al (2017) 
note that “it has become conventional wisdom that WTO negotiations remain 
deadlocked” (Allee et al, 2017. P.333-334). This adds further incentive to nations 
looking to strike timely arrangements that go beyond the mandate of the WTO, 
and scholars have been concerned that this might result in contradicting legal 
obligations between WTO and PTA agreements.  
Allee et al conducted a comprehensive systematic textual analysis of all 
PTAs signed since 1993. They found overwhelming evidence that the links and 
overlap between WTO legislation (identified by direct quotes from, alignment 
with, and affirmative language toward WTO documents) and PTAs have been 
growing since the mid-1990s. This shows that WTO members are using PTAs 
largely to bypass the immobile consensus structure of the WTO. Interestingly, it is 
the same major players, mostly the OECD nations who are most active in 
pursuing PTAs. This “suggests that these major economic players are more 
committed to the multilateral trade regime than some commentators have feared 
(Allee et al, 2017. P.363).  
Building from these findings, we see that the WTO has slowed due to its 
incumbent membership and the subsequent difficulty in reaching consensus on 
key topics. Also, as noted by Kostecki (2009), members have often negotiated 
terms of accession with prospecting nations which fall outside the WTO mandate. 
It is not silly to theorise that with the slowing of WTO progression, and an excess 
of extra interests to pursue, that major players would seek PTAs as a way of 
advancing their specific economic and geopolitical interests in specific nations 
and regional blocs, in a timely fashion which by-passes the need for consensus. 
This allows them to directly apply their political and economic dominance to 
leverage favourable deals that go above and beyond WTO mandate. To determine 




which do this. A good starting point would be the arbitration clauses found in 
such PTAs as the proposed but scrapped (by Trump) Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. These 
arbitration laws, were they enacted, would have allowed multi-national 
corporations to sue nations for impeding their profitability in the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, where companies can expect 
more favourable outcomes than the WTO arbitration process. This direct and 
widespread assault of national sovereignty effectively bypasses the WTO dispute 
settlement system without the host of the multi-national technically breaching its 
WTO obligations.  
 
In summary, the GATTs initial mandate, as devised by Clayton and 
implemented by Marshal and Truman as an extension of the Marshal plan and 
thus U.S geopolitical interests, based its initial model somewhere between Hayek 
and Keynes. Its focus was liberalising and coordinating trade and as such it 
functioned as a publicly funded, broadly neoliberal coordinator. In practice, this 
worked well with Western best practices throughout the Bretton Woods era and 
well into the neoliberal era, and it became somewhat of an international country 
club for the G7 and its friends, particularly the other OECD countries. Accession 
to the club was largely based on the applicant’s geopolitical standing and came 
with increased trade opportunities. Interaction and compliance with the WB and 
IMF are also relevant indicators of successful accession applicants. 
 The Uruguay round of negotiations resulted in the incorporation of the 
GATT into a wider framework of market coordination and trade liberalisation. 
Interestingly the negotiations ran through a period of changing economic and 
social perspectives, from neoliberal to neoclassical models of development. As 
such the neoliberal foundations and legally binding agreements of the negotiations 
were quickly becoming relics when they took effect. They were then begrudgingly 
put into policy over the following decade. Many of these policies worked well in 
both neoliberal and MME templates, but some such as TRIPS have been 
questioned in the more flexible neoclassical era for their monopolistic 
propensities. 
 The following Doha round in 2008 collapsed over negotiations between 




dominance in the institution. There was also a great deal of conflict between the 
North and South, with India finding support from over forty other developing 
nations when they stood fast against the invasive liberalisation the developed 
nations were attempting to bind them to. With the developing nations almost 
holding a united majority, and with disagreements internal to the North Atlantic, it 
seems unlikely that the blockade on all-encompassing trade agreements via the 
WTO will let up any time soon. This, along with the shift towards a more 
protectionist model of capitalism post-2008, explains the rise of bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements. 
 
 
2.4: The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and 
the 
Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development 
 
In 1947 representatives of European countries met in Paris at the invitation 
of Britton and France. The agenda of the day was a coordinated transition into the 
Marshal Plan, and from it, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) was born. Its mandate was to address B.O.P deficits while liberalising 
participants and lowering quotas, as both a symbol of cooperation and a condition 
of U.S aid (Wolfe, 2007; Clark & Thompson, 2011).  
 
Apart from Spain’s exclusion on the grounds of its autocratic State under 
Franco, participation in the OEEC was Optional. “Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Western 
Germany” became members with the U.S and Canada as associated observers. 
“By 1958 all were members of NATO except the Neutrals (Austria, Ireland, 
Sweden and Switzerland)” (Wolfe, 2007; P.1), and the OEEC had reduced tariffs 
and trade restrictions between participants by 90 percent (Wolfe, 2007). 
The treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 and enacted in 1958, thus forming 
the controversial European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC undermined 
the OEEC’s role in the monetary coordination of Europe by taking on the role of 




combination of its own successes and the forming of the EEC left the OEEC with 
no real role to play in the global economy. 
While the OEEC was stumbling, tensions were mounting between the 
EEC and the nations which would later (1960) form the European Free Trade 
Agreement (EFTA); an association formed by nations excluded from or unwilling 
to join the EEC. The seven future members of the EFTA (Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), were 
concerned about EEC tariff concessions negatively affecting their own exports to 
EEC nations. The U.S. under-secretary stepped in proposing late in 1958 “what 
came to be known as the Dillon round of multilateral trade negotiations in the 
GATT (Wolfe, 2007. P.2). These negotiations did not begin until 1960 and lasted 
until 1962; an infuriating time frame for the EFTA nations. In the meantime, they 
explored other avenues.  
On 12-01-1960, just eight days after EFTA’s formation, representatives 
from its seven members and the founding members of the EEC along with the 
U.S, met informally at the hotel majestic in Paris ahead of the OEEC annual 
ministerial meeting (Clark & Thompson, 2011). The French and Americans broke 
etiquette by ignoring the alphabetical seating arrangement when they sat together 
ahead of the others arrival. This symbolised, along with the non-invitation of the 
OEEC secretary general, a marked shift in politico-economic thought and the 
intent to overhaul the struggling OEEC from the outside (Clark & Thompson, 
2011). In an international environment of increasing U.S trade surpluses, account 
deficits, and tensions with the Soviet Union over control of Berlin, and with 
communisms rapid inroads into southeast Asia and south America; came the 
creation of the G4, composed of the present parties. A subsequent G4 report in 
April of 1960 suggested the OEEC be reformed into a new entity whose purpose 
“would be to coordinate the provision of aid to underdeveloped countries, and to 
offer consultations on economic policy and trade [both within and] beyond 
Europe” (Clark & Thompson, 2011). A decided emphasis on third world capitalist 
development to quell the communist expansion in these areas, as well as the 
U.S.’s desire to share the financial burden of this geo-strategic task, resulted in the 
addition of development to the title. Despite internal squabbles and political vying 
for influential positions, a final draft of the OECD convention was signed on 14-




The convention was enacted in September of 1961, and it carried over its 
full membership: “Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and both occupied zones of Western Germany” 
(Clifton & Díaz-Fuentes, 2011. P.558). It also accepted the U.S, Canada and 
Spain as full members. However, from this point, and for the next several 
decades, it heavily restricted membership with only “Japan (1964), Finland 
(1969), Australia (1971) and New Zealand (1973)” (Clifton & Díaz-Fuentes, 
2011. P.558) gaining membership before the 1990s.  
From 1961 until the early 1990s, the OECD acted as an exclusive trans-
Atlantic club. It used a comparative research agenda steeped in U.S driven 
economic practices to promote and aid member’s development toward a co-
ordinated trans-Atlantic market place. It also promoted policies seen as best 
practice in the Atlantic to other nations it sought to influence (Wolfe, 2007). As 
early as 1975 the OECD was being critiqued as an exclusive club of U.S allied, 
market-oriented nations who could reach rapid self-interested consensuses, the 
results of which were disseminated to/through the UN, IMF, WB, and WTO 
among others (Camps, 1975). During these decades, changes to the OECD’s 
economic base changed with, rather than set, the dominant economic discourse of 
its major players (Clifton & Díaz-Fuentes, 2011).   
The insurgence of neoliberalism in the wake of the 1968 crises, the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and then the oil shock of 1973; and in 
particular, the insurgence of Friedmanite neoliberalism through the late 1970s and 
1980s, affected the national policies proposed by the OECD. As this economic 
doctrine gained ground internationally, through its entrenchment in the U.S, it 
gained increasing support from orthodox and conservative economists. 
Friedmanite neoliberalism was seen as the way to solve the U.S’s ongoing 
financial qualms, and even though these were wholly unique to the U.S, the 
perspectives soon gained ground as their successes were observed on a purely 
financial platform which disregarded social and ecological concerns, as did U.S 
priorities. Alternatives, especially those grounded in demand-side economics 





The McCracken report of 1977 proved controversial as it split national 
interests and opinions in its attempt to push Friedmanite economics into the 
OECD economics department. The report failed to convince both national and 
OECD staff economists who were trained in the Keynesian fashion, of 
neoliberalism’s worth. As such the ideological shifts were less than had been 
hoped for by those in favour of the new paradigm. This shows that as early as 
1977 the influence was being felt in the OECD, but that not all parties were on 
board with the shift yet. It does, however, mark the beginning of the OECD’s 
paradigm shift. Over the course of the early 1980s the OECD was criticised by 
both Reagan and Thatcher as being insufficiently market-oriented (Clifton & 
Díaz-Fuentes, 2011; Marris, 1983).  
An OECD working paper published in 1983 combines Supply-side 
economics with Austerity measures and Quotes a “widely-held distrust of ad hoc 
interventionism” (Chouraqui & Price, 1983). Another, published in 1987, reviews 
the economic shifts throughout the 1980s. It notes not only that the above-
mentioned shifts in perspective had become the mainstream by 1985, but also that 
unexpected shortcomings in the realms of sustained growth, inflation control, 
employment growth and budget deficit reductions expected from them have been 
largely due to insufficient structural reform including insufficient liberalisation in 
the fields of  financial markets, privatisation, labour markets, the reduction of 
trade barriers and openness to foreign competition. Also held responsible are 
government interventions in free trade, fiscal and monetary policy, and 
irresponsible government spending, particularly social spending (Chouraqui, 
Clinton & Montador, 1987). This clearly shows the OECD’s paradigm shift to 
neoliberalism in the early 1980s.  
As far as Anti-Trust concerns go, the OECD is certainly pro-multi-national 
firm, and it is difficult to find working papers concerned with Anti-trust issues. 
The 2011 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
an amendment of the original 1976 document, lays out some guidelines 
concerning competition. Clause X.2 states that multinationals should: 
“Refrain from entering into or carrying out anti-competitive agreements 
among competitors, including agreements to: 
a) fix prices; 




c) establish output restrictions or quotas; or 
d) share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or 
lines of commerce.” (OECD, 2011). 
    
In line with this, Mayer, 1996, explores corporate governance in its 
variation between nations and its interaction with different ownership structures to 
attain the effects had on growth and competition; but what few anti-trust related 
policy recommendations can be found are geared toward facilitating both growth 
and competition. Both texts suggest an intermediate take on anti-trust concerns.
 Monopoly is not the concern here, but abuse of it, particularly where this 
undermines fairness in the commodity market. However, the OECD has no legal 
mandate or authority to impose or ensure adherence to its suggestions, and 
multinationals are simply implored to follow these practices in alignment with 
national legal structures. While the OECD suggests that nations adopt laws 
aligned with their suggestions, these are mostly intended to ensure no favouritism 
toward national enterprises is instituted over multinationals or external 
competition. So, while the OECD prescribes the above quoted narrow range of 
pro-competitive regulations, they seem to ignore the competitiveness of 
multinationals in national, and particularly developing nations where 
multinationals often have the means to outcompete any and all national 
competitors. This shows that the OECD is at least tacitly supportive of all but the 
most extreme Friedmanite values.  
In 1988, amidst pressures to include non-member nations in its research 
and evaluation programs, the OECD formed the Council on Non-Member 
Countries. They were particularly interested in the high growth Asian Tigers 
(Wolfe, 2007) although none of these but South Korea have gained accession. It 
was in 1992 that “ministers for the first-time elaborated principles for the 
participation of non-members in OECD work, and eventual membership” (Wolfe, 
2007. P.7). Subsequently admitted have been “Mexico (1994), [South] Korea 
(1996), and a number of European countries” (Wolfe 2007. P7) through the 1990s 
and 2000s. In 2007 “Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa [entered 
into a process of] enhanced engagement” (Wolfe, 2007. P.7); and accession 
negotiations opened with “Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia and Slovenia” (Wolfe, 




Interestingly, of these twelve countries who have either been admitted 
into, or entered accession negotiations with, the OECD; only four (South Korea, 
Chile, Israel, and Slovenia) have not borrowed from the WB, and only two (Israel 
and Slovenia) have escaped the clutches of IMF arrangements, and are the same 
two who have avoided both.  
Slovenia simply refused aid from either, choosing instead to implement 
gradual self-directed adjustments to their macro and micro-economic and social 
policies. As a result, Slovenia has out-performed its ex-soviet comrades becoming 
the first to gain entrance into the EU. By ignoring the WB’s harsh criticism of 
their non-shock therapy approach, and of course, by keeping government debt to a 
minimum; Slovenia had achieved by 2008 a per capita GDP of almost $27,000, 
total exports of $29 billion, unemployment of six percent, public debt of less than 
thirty percent, and a budget deficit of three percent (Slovenia facts, 2009).  
Israel has avoided both WB and IMF loans because, as a relatively 
wealthy nation, they didn’t need aid, and because their geopolitical alliances and 
capitalist history required, in the eyes of the west, no intervention18.    
A clear pattern can be observed here, of WB and IMF interference or aid 
adjusting national policy structures to align with neoliberal ‘best practices’, and 
entrenching nations into the global economy prior to accession negotiations taking 
place. Accession into the OECD represents a particular image or orthodox 
perspective of national success; One’s joining of the developed elite countries 
club. For some, especially those in South America and South Asia, this may be 
symbolic of the ideological victory of neoliberalism in a long-fought war of 
positions with left-leaning, nationalist, socialist, and communist thinkers, as well 
as large portions of the populace. It must be noted that original members such as 
the Nordic nations have not faced the same pressures as newcomers. 
Delving further into OECD interaction with other supranational 
institutions; there is an argument to be made that the OECD directly influences 
the IMF, WB and WTO, and in some cases, vice versa. The WTO is an observer 
on eighteen OECD bodies, while the IMF is an observer on thirty-nine, and the 
WB on forty-five. On top of this, senior OECD staff including the secretary 
 
18 In fact, discourse surrounding the MENA region and IMF and WB aid shows that peace treaties 
and alliance with Israel, who represents western and particularly U.S interests in the Middle East 
and North Africa, is a more accurate determinant of access to aid than economic status or 




general participate in high-level meetings of these institutions (Woodward, 2009). 
Furthermore, the bias of voting in the IMF, WB and until the Doha round, the 
WTO favours the G7 who’s like-mindedness and long-standing OECD 
membership creates a convergence of policy favouritism towards those perceived 
by these nations as best practice. As such, it necessitated from the mid-1980s for 
at least a decade, a commitment to a privatised, free-market global economy, with 
an emphasis on Friedmanite neoliberalism as espoused by the U.S who has 
historically held a highly weighted vote. As the global economy has grown in 
complexity, the G7 has come to rely more on the interconnected network of 
OECD, WB, IMF and WTO research and knowledge production. Thus, a cycle 
has emerged in which these institutions provide the knowledge and perceptions of 
‘best practice’ which are then voted as such by the G7, and then disseminated 
globally. It must be noted that as the neoliberal era wrapped up, fiscalism and a 
neoclassical model aligned with a flexible MME national template gained ground 
as a replacement.  
It has been noted by others, that influential to this network of knowledge 
creation are the lobbying efforts of some international think tanks, particularly the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the Bilderberg Conferences, the Trilateral 
Commission, the World Economic Forum, and the World Business Conference 
for Sustainable Development (Carroll, 2010). It is argued that these think-tanks 
influence global policy creation in the OECD in much the same way as the 
national scale equivalents discussed earlier do in the U.S. They will not be 
explored in depth here, but bear mentioning and further investigation at a later 
date. 
  
The OECD “works closely with several countries from Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean to further shape its work” (OECD Watch). Alluded to 
in this quote is the OECD’s ongoing interaction with emerging economies around 
the world.      
It was in the mid-1990s that the same green revolution that shook the WB 
spread through the OECD. These issues were illuminated by heavy criticism in 
the 1990s, as was the economic instability and inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth associated with OECD policy recommendations. In response to these 




its policy prescriptions, to settle on the neoclassical model of development centred 
on the MME national template, which introduced class compromise and sought to 
enhance economic stability in the free-market, thus maintaining its hegemonic 
legitimacy. Since then OECD research has sought to identify practical ways in 
which economies can simultaneously achieve stable growth, effective poverty 
reduction, and ecological sustainability. Its knowledge base of best practices is 
still wholly based on market principles, but the extremist Friedmanite values have 
given in to more nuanced neoclassical perspectives.  
 
To summarise, the OEEC was formed in 1947 to assist with the 
administration and coordination of the Marshal plan. All members except the few 
neutral countries became members of NATO within the following year, showing 
that the OECD was never interested solely in economic matters. In fact, 
geopolitical issues were a big motivation for the Marshal plan and subsequently 
for the OECD. In saying this, economic liberalism was always a top priority and 
as such 90 percent of tariffs and other tariffs and trade restrictions were removed 
in the first 11 years. 
The Treaty of Rome and the EEC created by it undermined the OEEC 
somewhat, taking on the role of monetary stabilisation, and leaving the OEEC 
largely purposeless. Then the creation of EFTA by the non-EEC nations of 
Europe began to challenge the EEC and heated debate erupted between the two. It 
was clear that rapid action was needed, and after an almost conspiratorial meeting, 
the G4 was formed and proposed the reformation of the OEEC into an entirely 
new organisation. 
This was realised in 1960, and the new OECD took on its role as an 
international country club of coordinated free market-oriented nations.   
Friedmanite neoliberalism first showed itself in the McCracken report of 
1977. By 1985 it was the mainstream ideologue of the institution. This timeline 
fits well with the national development of neoliberalism in the U.S and the U.K, 
which makes sense as at the time, the OECD took its policy prescriptions from its 
members, particularly the G7 nations.  
It continued down this path utill the mid-1990s, pushing its prescriptions 
which reflected its members’ international interests, through its research and 




Each of these supranational institutions are observers on relevant OECD 
bodies, and OECD staff participate in decision-making procedures within them. 
This, along with the G7’s weighted influence in each institution gave the G7, and 
particularly the U.S, a controlling stake in global economic coordination and 
development. 
Heavy criticism in the late 1980s and early 1990s focussed on the 
inequality, increased poverty and ecological issues associated with their 
prescriptions. They were forced, in order to maintain legitimacy with the public, 
to re-assess their actions and mandates. They subsequently began to address these 
issues by toning down Friedmanite aspects of their policies and allowing for the 
flexibility of the neoclassical model and MME template. 
 
 
3.5: Section Conclusions 
 
Section three has demonstrated that neoliberal ideology, and particularly 
that of Friedman, has been utilised by supranational institutions, twisted to fit the 
wants, needs and interests of dominant G7 nations (both economic and 
geopolitical), then forced rigorously, ruthlessly and relentlessly on the world 
between the early 1970s and mid-1990s; after which class compromises and 
ecological protection were increased to maintain the legitimacy of neoliberalism 
in a broader form. 
Beginning in the U.S, Friedmanite neoliberal ideals infiltrated these four 
supranational institutions. The ideology and tenets of Friedmanite neoliberalism 
were moulded to further serve the anti-communist geopolitical objectives of 
OECD nations in the cold war era. This provided grounds for a more forced 
induction of nations into the global market economy.  
As the development trajectories of these institutions aligned, led by the G7 
nations and implemented via their political and economic dominance, influence 
via the OECD, weighted voting powers, and in some cases their power to appoint 
presidents; these institutions have been amalgamated into a complementary and 
coordinated set of mechanisms for the purpose of global economic and 





It has been observed through historical analysis, that through the 
neoliberal era, and to a lesser extent, since; the IMF and WB worked, often 
together to (a) open new markets to capital, (b) enforce a level of free-market 
capitalist structural adjustment that (1) makes it difficult, if not impossible to 
revert to communism, and (2) provides lasting conditions preferable to 
transnational corporations. They (c) create the infrastructure necessary for capital 
and business to run effectively and efficiently, and (d) ensure further compliance, 
and an inescapable reliance on international companies, markets and investments 
through national debt.   
 
The IMF works by giving loans when countries have no alternatives to 
their “aid”. Nations are therefore almost powerless to resist their SAPs.  
Because the IMF doesn’t offer loans but is rather the only option for 
applicant nations in dire need of finance, negotiating power is weighted in a “you 
called us” relationship. The IMF covers immediate BOP deficits, on the grounds 
that borrowing nations make structural adjustments in line with western best 
practices, as set out by the OECD. These practices evolved through White’s 
prescriptions in the Bretton Woods era, followed by a moulded version of the 
Chicago school ideology following Friedman in the neoliberal era, then towards 
Samuelson’s neoclassicism the 1990s.   
The IMF’s role in the supranational institutional network is to convert 
nations to free-market economies and integrate them into the global economy. 
This is especially salient as these nations have often been pursuing protectionist 
measures and because shared economic hardships provide an incentive to adopt 
communal measures of shared provision such as communism or socialism. Thus, 
the IMF’s role as ‘lender of last resort’ might more accurately be thought of as a 
‘lender of first contact’. It contributes to points (a), (b) and (d) above. 
The WB contributes to (a), (b), (c) and (d), and while this overlap might 
seem to some as competition between the two to serve their respective functions 
and remain viable, it is more appropriately viewed as a functional overlap 
ensuring a comprehensive coverage of their true roles over the global community. 
Indeed, the two often work together now through the leading agency 
collaboration. The WB has brokered IMF loans with nations, and likewise, the 




arrangements, nations take loans from both institutions, but the leading agency is 
responsible for the coordination of SAPs.  
The WB is primarily a development lender. As mentioned earlier it lends 
for infrastructural projects designed to optimise conditions for industry and 
business to function efficiently and effectively. It has long been criticised from all 
angles as an institution who favours its major voting powers, and their 
multinationals, funding the projects which best serve their political and economic 
interests. From this perspective, the Poponoroeste highway in Brazil has been 
funded for the profitable harvest of the Amazon by multinationals, and General 
Suharto’s transmigration scheme can be seen as a means of clearing space for 
foreign-owned resorts.  
By loaning to nations not already indebted to the IMF, or whose IMF 
SAPs could be expanded in the interests of its OECD members, major voting 
powers, and their multinationals, the WB further opens markets to outside 
investment and competition. By facilitating big business through infrastructure 
and policy adjustments, the WB contributes to the reliance of nations on 
multinationals, while simultaneously serving corporations’ expansionist and 
profitability interests. Finally, by lending to nations unlikely to be able to repay 
debt, they embed nations into a commitment to, and reliance on, the network of 
supranational institutions and the interests they represent. 
Furthermore, The WB has established extensive knowledge production 
and dissemination networks which operate to legitimise its own projects and assist 
in the uptake of its endeavours, and as such further loans and influence.   
 
 The GATT/WTO has evolved to oversee the global economy. It works by 
providing legal obligations to its members in the areas of goods and service trade 
and regulation, intellectual property rights, and the arbitration of disputes in these 
areas. It also offers knowledge and data, which via skewed collection and 
measurement strategies, such as GDP measurement, guides members toward its 
own objective of maximised aggregate growth in national and global markets. 
From this data, it forms and advises best practices in line with those of the OECD.  
It offers incentives to members in the form of increased and supposedly 
non-preferential trade with other members, providing they stick to their free-




However, as noted, some nations have been blocked from entry by certain states 
until certain conditions are met. This is one way that the WTO acted as a policy 
tool for its major players. Its negotiation rounds also pushed bias trade 
liberalisation throughout its vast membership by creating legally binding 
agreements which favoured G7 and OECD nations. This trend persisted until the 
2008 Doha round of negotiations collapsed. However, all previous agreements 
still stand as binding. 
 
 The OECD is the mega-power of these supranational institutions. It has, 
since the mid-1980s, led the way in economic policy, and had for decades, already 
led the other institutions on geopolitical issues. It works as a forum for advanced 
industrialised countries, gathering data on the effects of their economic policy, 
and advising best practices going forward. In this, it is similar to the WTO and 
WB, except the methods of data gathering and rating/ranking vary between 
institutions19. The OECD’s subjective and ideologically saturated research agenda 
serves to legitimise the policy regimes preferred by the G7 nations. 
 The OEEC, and the OECD have developed from an institution of U.S 
hegemony in post war reparation and development, to an institution of G7 shared 
hegemony over global political and economic policy regimes. As such, and due to 
the G7’s combined voting power in each institution, the WTO, WB, and IMF have 
 
19  The OECD uses an in-depth peer-review process by which members rate and compare 
each other’s policies, recommending via workshops and seminars, best practice in accordance 
with OECD data. Research programs are agreed upon by members, creating the opportunity to 
bias programs toward ideologically saturated measures. The major powers within the OECD are 
the G7 nations, and these get the majority of attention and say within the process. This process 
has been developed since 1991. Before this rating was much less formal (Francesco, 2016). 
The WB has three distinct indexes. Put briefly, they are the Doing Business indicator 
which “ranks countries according to the intrusiveness of various sorts of regulations on business 
activities” (Francesco, 2016. P.356). The World Governance Index which measures six aspects of 
national governance: “Voice and accountability, policy stability, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality” (Francesco, 2016. P.358). And the Regulatory 
Quality sub-index of the World Government Index, which “focuses on the policy output and 
“includes measures of the incidence of market un-friendly policies such as price control or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perception of the burdens of imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development”” ((Kaufmann et al, 2004. 
P.255) Francesco, 2016. P.358). The WB uses a combination of surveying local experts and 
officials, and directly analyzing regulatory policy. It advises via direct communication with officials 
and public media (Francesco, 2016). 
The WTO monitors national trade policies, ranking nations’ performance by such 




been articulated to the OECD’s agenda. Thus, each institution serves the interests 
of the G7 in its own place in the cooperative Supranational institutional network.   








This thesis was composed of two main themes. They were a) the national 
and international progression from ideological models to practical models of 
development through debate, compromise, and the tactical positioning of 
intellectuals and supporters, and b) how the practical models in question have 
gained influence in national and international institutions, and how their influence 
is then spread through these institutions.  
 
Section one explored some of the key ideological models which have been 
proposed by scholars in the 20th century. The purpose of this was to illustrate the 
key differences of these perspectives, a) to provide a nuanced understanding of 
each set of values and perspectives and how they came to be, and b) to 
demonstrate how these ideological works each propose a blueprint for national 
and/or international development. 
Both Mises and Friedman based their models on assumptions, which 
following Keynes among others are seen as fallacious. These assumptions are a) 
that competitive market forces lead to the most efficient use of resources and will 
direct capital, resources and labour into only the production of those items which 
best meet societal needs and reasonable wants, b) that capitalists who direct them 
elsewhere are destined for failure, c) that free-markets will inevitably result in the 
stable equilibrium that best serves humanity, and d) that stable free markets are 
not just possible, but prevalent, and that all which is required for their realization 
is the disassembly of restricting government regulation and intervention.  
Hayek offered a more nuanced neoliberalism which was refined by others 
into ordo-liberalism and implemented in Germany and beyond to prosperous ends. 
It is a shame that Hayek is often lumped in with Mises and Friedman and accused 
of the same assumptions. A careful reading of The Road to Serfdom will reveal 
that he went to great lengths to correct these assumptions via careful state 
regulation and interference. This book is worth reading by anyone with an interest 
in the universal betterment of humanity.   
Keynes offers a scathing critique of classical liberalism, and particularly these 




“(1) that the real wage is equal to the marginal disutility of the existing 
employment; 
(2) that there is no such thing as involuntary unemployment in the strict 
sense; 
(3) that supply creates its own demand in the sense that the aggregate 
demand price is equal to the aggregate supply price for all levels of 
output and employment.” (Keynes, 1936. P.20). 
 
 His general theory is based almost entirely around overcoming them, and 
he proposes an entire blueprint founded on this premise. His works were hugely 
influential in the early 1900s and influenced the new deal, but his wisdom was 
pushed aside in the wake of WW11 for the ambitious U.S centric proposals of 
White. 
White didn’t offer a full template as the others did. He was simply 
concerned with creating an international institutional framework for the 
consolidation of U.S hegemony, and he was very successful, but as shown in 
section two, rather short-sighted.  
Finally, Samuelson who had been an economist since at least the1940s 
reached prominence with his neo-Keynesian synthesis of neoliberal and 
Keynesian thoughts. Though the neoliberal aspects he proposed resembled more 
those of Hayek than Friedman, it is shown in section two that existing Friedmanite 
values were carried through instead. Samuelson can be rightly called the father of 
neo-Keynesianism, and his works build the foundation for the modern MME. As 
such they are quite flexible, but as noted, followers such as Giddens have 
proposed more specific structures to sit atop them. 
 
It is important to recall the juxtaposition of these scholars’ views on 








• Equality: Equality in the eyes of the law is promoted so 
that individuals can better achieve their own inherently 
unequal potentials. 
• Special privileges: No special privileges should be given to 
anyone. Capitalists do not have special privileges due to 
their ownership of production facilities and control of 
labour. 
• Monopoly: Competition will negate monopoly except 
where companies control a resource. In such cases, 
exorbitant profits may be taxed. 
• Role of the state: “Guaranteeing the protection of life, 
health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks” 
(Mises,1927. P.52). 
• International relations: Open interaction and free trade and 




• Equality: Equality of outcome is both undesirable and 
impractical. Private education and unrestricted markets 
offer the most equality of opportunity.  
• Special privileges: None to be given to any member, group 
or class of society other than limited tax incentives to the 
poorest. 
• Monopoly: Monopoly is not a concern and bears no societal 
harms to speak of. Note that this view was developed in the 
FMP and Friedman had spoken strongly of the societal 
risks of monopoly previous to this corporately funded 
project’s commencement. Note also that Friedman 
neglected to mention the two most relevant forms of 
monopolisation in Capitalism and Freedom. 
• The role of the state: To set the rules of the game, moderate 
their differing interpretations, and enforce them on those 




• International relations: The individual is the focus of his 
doctrine and any restrictions put on international trade are 




• Equality: Whilst equality of outcome is seen as restricting 
to individual and thus societal potentials, equality of 
opportunity is promoted so long as it doesn’t restrict 
impersonal market functions. 
• Special privileges: No special privileges were to be given. 
However, state-facilitated unemployment insurance and 
state employment of the otherwise unemployed were seen 
as beneficial aids so long as employment completed tasks 
beneficial to society and incompatible with private markets. 
• Monopoly: Seen as inherently undesirable, Hayek proposes 
it can be thwarted through disadvantageous monetary 
policy and direct regulation. 
• Role of the state: The regulation of monopoly, the 
organisation and/or provision of social insurance and state 
employment, the control of monetary policy and supply, the 
provision of healthcare and security, or any other task 
deemed beneficial or necessary to society which the 
competitive market is ill-suited to provide. 
• Hayek proposed an international federation sporting 
laissez-faire policy while leaving nations free to create their 
own. This federation would control or coordinate a military 
presence large enough to enforce its laws and halt 
international military invasions, thereby maintaining peace. 
 
Keynes: 
• Equality: Although some degree of inequality of outcome 
is required to incentivise the necessary range of human 




redistributive tax and payment mechanisms, rigid wage 
policy, and state employment on national projects. 
• Special privileges: The above three equalising mechanisms 
are seen as special privileges. 
• Monopoly: While monopoly is seen as undesirable, 
Keynes, in his sceptical realism, has cleverly crafted his 
blueprint to function in states of both perfect or imperfect 
competition. 
• Role of the state: To stimulate the economy and maintain a 
level of equality through public works and employment, 
provide stability through wage, fiscal and monetary policy, 
as well as responsible usury laws, and to provide justice, 
security, education, healthcare and other beneficial 
services to society. 
• International Relations: Keynes promoted an international 
clearing union that would, via a newly created and printed 
international currency, provide much-needed capital and 





• International Relations: White proposed an international 
system of fixed exchange fiat currencies attached to a gold 
exchangeable U.S dollar. The institution of choice to 
oversee international affairs was the IMF which would lend 
to nations to cover BOP deficits, provided conditional 
policy reforms were implemented. 
 
Samuelson:  
• Equality: Some degree of inequality of outcome is 
necessary for the functioning of society. However, these 
can be reduced, and their negative effects offset through 




• Special privileges: Include exorbitant incomes for CEOs, 
celebrities, and top professionals, particularly those in 
finance. Privileges are also extended to the poor, elderly 
and disabled in the form of welfare payments, special 
grants, subsidised or free healthcare and education 
programs, food stamps and accommodation allowances. 
• Monopoly: With little hope of restoring perfect 
competition, Samuelson focusses instead on negating the 
negative effects of imperfect competition. He even accepts 
monopolistic and oligarchic industries and points to the few 
benefits of these industries of scale. He is, however, always 
looking to increase the equality of both outcome and 
opportunity. 
• Role of the state: MME states provide progressive and 
redistributive tax systems and public spending on things 
like justice, defence, welfare, roading, and education and 
healthcare subsidies. They also make fiscal and monetary 
adjustments to stabilise the economy and maintain 
international political and economic relations which 
facilitate international trade in the private sector. 
Furthermore, they regulate undesirable business practices 
and inefficiencies through anti-trust law and direct 
regulation of wage prices, working conditions, and 
damaging environmental practices. They also offer 
incentives and disincentives for desirable and undesirable 
practices respectively. 
• International relations: Samuelson gives preference to free 
and unrestricted trade between nations adapted to the 
flexible MME national template. 
 
Section two then presented a historical narrative of capitalism’s 
development between WW11 and the mid-1990s, focussing on the U.S. but 
delving at times into that of the U.K. The purposes of this were (a) to illuminate 




and (b) to show the complex political and social compromises that are unique to 
each nation but indefinitely result in a variance of policy outcomes from the 
purely ideological model, thus demonstrating the difference between ideological 
and practical models of development. 
 Four separate stages of capitalism were identified within this timeframe, 
three of which were the result of intentional interventions in the political 
trajectory by agents who advocated specific ideologies.  
 The first stage has been dubbed the Bretton Woods era. It resulted from 
negotiation and compromise between the allied nations near the end of WW11. 
The key nations in these negotiations were the U.S and Britain, and the key agents 
were Keynes and White.  
 Much to Keynes’ chagrin, his superior intellect was bulled over by 
White’s tact, and the U.S.’s superior bargaining power. The result was the formal 
agreement of an international model of development. The national template would 
be largely carried over from the 1933 New Deal, and included state education and 
healthcare, strong labour unions, rigid wage policy, national works and 
employment, and increasing welfare programs. These roles were carried out to 
minimise inequality and provide fair opportunity to society. 
 The U.S dollar was linked to gold and others to it, as per White’s plan to 
make the dollar and gold synonymous in the dollar centric global economy. 
 States were to be overseen by two institutions, the IMF and the WB. The 
IMF was to loan for BOP deficits and the WB for reconstruction and development 
projects. However, two more were formed to aid the administration of the Marshal 
plan in Europe and coordinate national policy toward the New Deal template. 
 This era provided a degree of stability, growth and equality until the 
financial crisis of the late 1960s cast the world into turmoil. The U.S practically 
defaulted on its global responsibilities. In 1971 it freed the dollar from gold, and 
in 1973 it floated the dollar’s exchange rate. Pandemonium ensued. 
 With little solid footing in the North-West, capital spilled out into the 
developing countries in bulk, aided by the developing roles of international 
institutions. By the late-1970s however, a new tide was coming in. The ideas of 
Friedman and the Chicago schools of economics and law were gaining clout. 
Backed by an array of economists and politicians it started to influence the 




 In 1979 Thatcher was elected Prime minister of the U.K, and in 1981 
Reagan became president of the U.S. These elections mark the end of the Bretton 
Woods era as the two new leaders set about embedding neoliberal tenets into 
policy in their respective nations. Thatcher leaned a little more towards Hayek’s 
blueprint early on and had to face the remnants of socialism. Reagan went directly 
for Friedmanite neoliberalism. Labour unions, wage regulation, welfare programs, 
and state-owned enterprises were largely dismantled over the following years. 
Monetary policy was promoted above fiscalism as the cure-all for economic woes, 
and political compromise took place between austerity and supply-side 
proponents. Thatcher grew more Friedmanite as the years went by.  
 Neoliberalism spread around the G7 and Friedmanite values seeped into 
the increasingly interconnected and coordinated international institutions. 
Through these institutions, the G7 began to dictate self-interested policy and build 
an international institutional and legally binding framework that cemented them 
on the top rungs of global economic and geopolitical power. However, even they 
began to rely on the research and knowledge created by this network.  
 Through the late-1980s and early-1990s, the international institutions 
came under heavy criticism for favouring developed nations and multinational 
corporations over the welfare of developing nations and their populaces. As such 
the G7 nations also came under increasing pressure. It was clear changes were 
needed to ease international tensions and maintain the legitimacy of the global 
framework. Thus, through the mid-late-1990s, led by Tony Blair’s government 
and the Clinton administration, and in line with the survivalist tactics of the 
international institutions, Britain and the U.S moved toward the more flexible 
third-way formulation of the MME template. This marks the end of the neoliberal 
era, and the beginning of the neoclassical era.  
The nationally flexible practical MME template retains a free-market 
policy structure. It prescribes low or no trade barriers and alters the structure of 
class compromise, reintroducing the welfare safety net, increasing redistributive 
taxes, and progressively raising wages, as well as rewarding professionals and 
investors for putting their labour or capital to use. It combines monetary and fiscal 
controls, and compromises between austerity, supply-side, and demand-side 




the 2008 financial crises, after which noticeable trends have leant towards more 
protectionism. 
  
 Section three set out to track the development of four key inter/supra-
national institutions; the IMF, WB, WTO, and OECD, over the same period. The 
purpose of this was to (a) see if they were affected by the same shifts in thinking 
and the same ideological movements as the U.S was, (b) to see if they were 
politically influenced by the North Atlantic toward given ends, and (c) to discern 
their relative positions and roles in the global economy, and whether they worked 
in unison or competition with each other to fulfil them. 
   
 The IMF, founded at the Bretton Woods conferences under the 
direct influence of White, struggled initially as the Marshal Plan institutions 
(GATT and OEEC) impeded on its role as lender of last resort to cover national 
BOP deficits. The Bretton Woods era was constructed to institutionalise U.S 
hegemony, and as its main vehicle, the IMF has always been in a prime position 
to do so, with weighted voting powers for the U.S, and communism quelling 
conditions for lending. However, the Marshal plan undermined its function in this 
area.   
 The ideological shift to Friedmanite neoliberalism, however, reinvigorated 
the institution and it shifted its focus accordingly. The U.S maintained its voting 
bias within the institution, but increasingly merged its will with that of the wider 
G7 and even OECD membership who shared geopolitical and economic interests 
in the developing world. The same bloc held dominant influence in the WB and 
WTO as well, and the institutions became increasingly coordinated over the 
neoliberal era.  
During the neoliberal era, the IMF took on the role of lender of first 
contact, venturing into the developing world with much-needed loans and harsh 
SAPs that bent nations toward the neoliberal national template. This involved 
opening borders to FDI, selling state-owned assets, removing trade barriers, and 
reducing wage and labour protection. It indebted nations on legally binding 
contracts, and reformed policy. It also opened nations up to outside companies 
and aimed for the comprehensive liberalisation of capital accounts to FDI and 




capital, finance and industry, and a subsequent vulnerability to sudden outflows; 
as well as binding them to the framework via debt. Its role in the global 
framework was essentially to begin the process of integration of developing 
nations into the supra-national regulatory framework. 
 
The WB which was also founded at the Bretton Woods conference, but 
under the guidance of Keynes, also found itself undermined by the Marshal plan 
early on. It found itself with no real role in Europe as the Marshal plan had taken 
up the role of development lending, albeit with better terms for the nations in 
question. It to struggled along until the rise of Friedmanite neoliberal ideology, at 
which point it set its sights on the developing world. 
The WBs rise was swift under McNamara. He created lakes of funding fed 
by rivers of public and private investors and went to work loaning it to developing 
nations for development projects. There were of course conditions, which would 
serve the same functions as IMF SAPs if the IMF had not lent to the nation 
previously or supplement them if it had. These took the form of WB SAPs and 
were continued under subsequent leaders who only grew in Friedmanite ideology 
through the 1980s. 
The G7 and OECD nations held a dominant influence in WB proceedings, 
and as such, the WB has served their geopolitical and economic interests well; 
damning the flood of communism during the cold war and integrating nations into 
the global framework through debt and the increased reliance of nations on 
outside capital and industry. Furthermore, it implanted a complex network of 
knowledge creation and dissemination to provide legitimacy to its cause. 
Development projects funded the facilitation and growth of private 
industry, and SAPs focussed on further opening nations economies up to FDI and 
foreign companies. As such, the WB’s role in the global framework became that 
of the industrial embedder.   
 
GATT was formed as part of the Marshal plan to coordinate North 
Atlantic, particularly European economic and trade policy, and to secure a united 
front against the spread of communism. Its mandate was to provide a multilateral 
legally binding framework of trade policy. It has always focussed on free-trade 




neoliberal era. It did, however, alter its research and policy advice to back the 
corporate model following the lead of the OEEC/OECD (and thus the G7), and 
expand its membership broadly, bringing into its fold the nations whose policy 
had been aligned by the IMF and WB to the dominant template. In doing so it 
further integrated them into the global framework which its role is to oversee.  
Its legally binding contracts ensure that members abide by the template 
and offer them the incentive of increased trade to do so. It has been noted that in 
the past the WTO has denied countries entry on geopolitical conditions, and also 
that nations, particularly the G7 and the U.S, have vetoed accessions until 
conditions are met that fall outside the WTO’s mandate. 
 
The OEEC/OECD was created to oversee and coordinate the 
administration of aid under the Marshal plan. It has always worked closely with 
the WTO, providing research and knowledge for the better implementation and 
overseeing of aid provision and trade agreements. It was developed by the U.S 
and G7 through the early 1980s into a centre for international research and 
neoliberal policy advocacy and increased its ties and coordination with the IMF 
and WB also. 
It has become the highest echelon in the network and provides much of the 
international and national policy framework by which the others abide. It is a 
vehicle of G7 shared hegemony, and non-G7 membership is almost symbolic of 
full integration into the network and its framework. It works by (a) creating 
research and knowledge that legitimises its cause, (b) through the inclusion of 
other institutions as observers of its bodies and procedures, as well as the 
participation top officials in decision-making procedures in the other institutions, 
and (c) through the G7’s dominant influence in each institution which aids their 
convergence on OECD policy proposals and confuses the origin of these 
proposals. 
 
The early 1990s saw the entire network, as well as the G7, come under 
heavy criticism for its favouritism of multinationals, the harshness of IMF and 
WB SAPs, and the negative social impacts felt by influenced nations. The 
amassed criticisms brought into question the legitimacy of the framework, the 




In order to survive and maintain any lasting influence and ensure the continuation 
of the global free-market order, huge compromises were made on national and 
international scales. 
This basically ended the neoliberal era of capitalism which had grown to 
be internationally dominant, and brought about the era of neoclassical capitalism. 
This allowed more national flexibility and ownership of national policy 
frameworks and focussed more attention on social and environmental effects. It 
also allowed and renewed legitimacy in the supranational institutional network 
and free markets through class compromises and compromised internationally 
between the north and south; or the advanced and G7 nations and the developing 
world. 
 
Section one contributed to the first key theme by providing a nuanced 
understanding of the values and perspectives held by each of the key scholars of 
this timeframe, and the unique ideological models of national and/or international 
development they formed. 
Section two illuminated four distinct stages of capitalism and identified 
their proponents and ideological backing. It also showed the complex political and 
social compromises experienced in the U.S through the implementation of 
ideology into practice, which resulted in the differentiation between the pure 
ideological models and the practical models of development that are based on but 
deviate from them. By including aspects of British development, section two also 
showed how the challenges faced, compromises reached, and implemented 
national policy structures are unique to each nation but indefinitely result in a 
variance of policy outcomes from the purely ideological model.  
By fulfilling these purposes, sections one and two have demonstrated the 
national progression from ideological models to practical models of development 
through debate, compromise, and the tactical positioning of intellectuals and 
supporters, thereby delivering on the thesis’s first key theme. 
 
Section three found that the inter/supranational institutions were in fact 
influenced by the same ideological movements and demonstrated that they were 
politically influenced by the G7 and OECD nations, particularly the U.S., toward 




economy and demonstrated that they work in unison with each other to fulfil their 
shared and individual roles. Thereby maintaining and growing the influence of the 
global institutional network, the national and international policy frameworks it 
supports, and the influence of its key players, at least between WW11 and the 
mid-1990s. Thus, it has delivered on its second major theme. 
 
This thesis has shown how the G7 and OECD nations, particularly the 
U.S., have utilised this integrated network of supra-national institutions to (a) set 
the rules of the game, or the framework inside which economic and political 
developments take place, whilst ensuring (b) that their geo-political interests are 
prioritised, and (c) that their economic interests, and as such those of the 
corporations they host, are taken care of. 
In doing so it has evidenced the need for an integrated approach 
combining geopolitical, profitability, and spontaneity of development discourses 
into a single theory of global development. It has also evidenced the need for 
increased integration of sociological, economic, political, and historic analysis and 
discourse into the same approach in order to gain informed perspectives and 
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